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Revenge is a universal phenomenon in human behavior. All
human societies that have established moral or legal codes
of conduct have based these codes, to varying degrees, upon
systemized retribution. In times of war, societies and
their institutions undergo a transformation in which
pathological behavior can potentially undermine the moral
restraints that regulate the instruments of legitimized
revenge. When this happens, especially in the case of
military retribution against civilians, the result is an
abhorrent tragedy.
Such a tragedy occurred in June, 1942, when elements of
the German army destroyed the Czechoslovak town of Lidice in
retaliation for the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich. The
soldiers involved in the massacre were clearly not homicidal
maniacs, yet they still were able to make the difficult
moral decision to participate int he killing. By examining
history, as well as psychological, sociological, and
political theory, it is possible to develop a method for
studying the means by which these soldiers were given
adequate permission to engage in pathological activity.
This permission comes from two sources. The first source
is found in personal psychological reactions to the context
of war. The nature of partisanship evokes pathological
behavior trends in nonpathological individuals. In this
study, the phenomenon is called "unconscious" permission.
The second source of permission comes from the language of
individual leaders. Through rhetoric, propoganda, and
direct orders, leaders can provide their subordinates with
"conscious" permission to engage in pathological behavior.
Recent developments in diplomacy regarding military
peacekeeping have placed more demands upon soldiers for
rational, more mature decisions and behavior than ever
before. Contemporary military leaders and statesmen must be
aware of the effects of their language in the context of war
if modern peacekeeping missions are to avoid the spectre of
revenge.
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Chapter I
Introduction

On the evening of June 9, 1942, elements of the German
army, accompanied by the Czech gendarmerie, surrounded the
Czechoslovak mining town of Lidice.

They established

roadblocks to completely isolate the community. None of the
villagers could leave, and no outsiders could enter the
town.

The soldiers allowed only those miners returning from

work to pass through the roadblocks.

That night, the

soldiers forced the people of Lidice from their homes and
began to execute an order issued earlier that day by the
acting Reichsprotector of Bohemia and Moravia.
The women and children were loaded onto trucks and
taken to nearby Kladno.
to the Horack farm.

In the morning, the men were taken

While the men waited in the farmyard,

the Germans busied themselves dispersing the livestock and
scouring the village, "requisitioning" valuables from the
houses of Lidice.

Later in the morning, a firing squad

assembled in the farmyard and the execution of the men of
Lidice began.

The Czech men were marched into the farmyard
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in groups of ten.

The Germans made the men stand in front

of mattresses placed against one of the walls of the yard.
When one line of men was shot, another group was marched in
and positioned in front of the last.

The executions

continued throughout the morning, with two pauses during
which the executioners were served schnapps to relieve their
fatigue, until the bodies of the men of Lidice completely
covered the yard of the Horack farm.
Meanwhile, in nearby Kladno, the women and children
were being evaluated and processed by the Germans.

Those

children deemed racially acceptable were set aside to be
sent to German foster families.

The rest were loaded onto

trains and sent first to the concentration camp at Lodz, and
from there to the extermination camp at Chelmno.

Those

children not yet one year of age accompanied their mothers
to the concentration camp at Ravensbruck.
After the village had been emptied of its inhabitants,
the Germans set to work demolishing it.

Workers set off

explosives in the buildings, dug up the cemetery, and set
the village ablaze.

Over the next few months, German

workers hauled the rubble of Lidice away and planted fields
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over the ruins, leaving only the faint traces of a few
building foundations as testament to the fact that a town
once stood on the spot.
The destruction of Lidice was an act of revenge: A
direct response to the assassination of Reinhardt Heydrich,
the SS officer in command of German-occupied territories in
Czechoslovakia.

The German actions at Lidice satisfied the

need for retribution among the German occupiers of
Czechoslovakia.

As a behavioral process of healing, the

destruction of Lidice served a vital function in satisfying
the natural, emotional desire of the Germans for retaliation
against their enemies.
To say that human beings are naturally driven to carry
out acts of revenge for offenses committed against
themselves or their affiliates is hardly a revelation.
Revenge is a motive force in human behavior as natural and
universal as any other aggressive survival tactic.

It is

likely that in any human language there exists a word or
words that describe revenge, balancing accounts, an evening
of scores.

In Western romance languages, the etymological

roots are found in the Latin: vincere, to conquer; vindex.
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avenger; vindicta. vengeance.

In German, die Rache or die

Revanche. and Revanche in French, describe revenge.

This

linguistic phenomenon extends far beyond the cultures of
Europe.

In the native cultures of New Zealand, the Maori

word, utu. denotes a continuing balance.

Utu implies a

process of retribution wherein the injured party may exact
immediate retaliation or instigate a long, protracted
partisan feud aimed at settling the score.

The motivation

for revenge goes far beyond the desire of an individual to
"get even."

Whether immediate or long term, action demands

reaction to maintain the social balance.
Most of the recorded attempts at regulating social
behavior through legalistic codes are founded on a system of
balancing offensive action with retributive reaction.
Religious texts shed light on the fundamental values
regarding the use of revenge as a balancing force in human
affairs.

The following passage from The Koran illustrates

the legitimate place of revenge in Islamic society:
We have therein commanded them that they
should give life for life, and eye for eye,
and nose for nose, and ear for ear, and tooth
for tooth; and that wounds should also be
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punished by retaliation.^
In a passage that is nearly identical to the Islamic "Law of
Retribution," the Hebrew book of Exodus outlines the
foundations for legitimate revenge:
If any harm follows, then you shall give life
for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand
for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound
for wound, stripe for stripe.^
The necessity for revenge in these passages seems
evident.

In order to regulate a population, rulers must

establish certain strictures which provide for the
possibility of retribution--the maintenance of a balance.
As human societies grew in size and complexity, so did the
legal codices expand to include more specific and complex
systems to regulate conduct.

At their core, though, human

law codes have and continue to contain the fundamental
philosophy of balance through retribution: Legitimized
revenge.
In an atmosphere of peace and stability, human
societies are able to effectively utilize this retributive

^ The Koran ch. V.
' Exodus XXI.
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philosophy to maintain social balance and harmony.

The

history of the human experience, as recorded through the
ages, does not, however, portray a generally continuous
atmosphere of peace and stability.

As cultures expanded and

came into contact with one another, the natural conflict
generated by social groups competing for territory and
resources more often than not led (and continues to lead) to
violence.

While revenge can effectively be used to maintain

harmony and balance during peacetime, it is the tendency of
humans at war to perpetuate revenge beyond the balancing of
a social equation.

In her philosophical work entitled, A

Strategy for Peace. Sissela Bok describes this tendency in
her analysis of what she calls the "Pathology of
Partisanship."
In time of war or other intense conflict,
partisanship can foster a pathology all its
own. When this happens, partisanship goes
beyond the emphasis on loyalty and cohesion
needed for the well-being of any community
and leads people to become obsessive and
heedless of their group's long-range selfinterest, and even of its survival.^

^ Sissela Bok, A Strategy for War and Peace: Human Values
and the Threat of War (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), p. 6.
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Though Bok does not address her analysis specifically to
revenge, the transition from partisanship to revenge in her
theory is not difficult to effect.

The goals of warring

partisans and people who carry-out acts of revenge are quite
similar: Partisans fight to right perceived injustices done
to them and their fellows; the Islamic "law of Retribution"
provides the legal framework within which injustices can be
righted.

If partisans are vulnerable to a pathological

escalation of their endeavors during warfare, then those
people and institutions who attempt to exact revenge upon
one another within the context of war are similarly
susceptible.

When this pathology comes to guide the hand of

a society's military institution, tragic atrocities too
often result.
These acts of revenge carried out by a society's
military apparatus mar the record of human history since
antiquity.

In 146 BC, Roman forces, largely in retaliation

for the humiliation of their own forces during Hannibal's
Italian campaign fifty years earlier, destroyed the city of
Carthage.

All of the inhabitants were either killed or

enslaved.

The city was razed to the ground and the fields
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sown with salt.

During the Thirty Years' War (1614-1618)

the distinction between combatants and noncombatants all but
vanished as the Christian denominations of Central Europe
fought a pathologically escalative war of annihilation.

In

the French Revolution of the following century, the towns
and inhabitants of Vendee and Lyon suffered the same sort of
retribution as had the Carthaginians so many centuries
earlier during the Punic Wars.

At Lyon, townspeople were

tied to stakes and fired upon by the cannon of the
Revolutionary forces.

Robespierre's Terror is the very

embodiment of pathological revenge during warfare.
The twentieth century has surpassed all other
historical epochs in the horror wrought by vindictive
behavior during war.

Revenge for the assassination of

Archduke Ferdinand of Austria in 1914 set in motion a chain
of events that developed into a war which forever changed
the culture of the Western world.

Within three decades,

place-names like Auschwitz, Chelmno, Ravensbruck, and Dachau
would emerge in our vocabulary to conjure up dark images of
Hitler's

wartime revenge against the Jews: Retaliation for

a fabricated Jewish movement which led to the German defeat
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in World War I.

The Allies decision to firebomb Dresden was

driven exclusively by revenge.

During the Vietnam War,

United States soldiers, in an act of pathological revenge
destroyed the village of Mi Lai and massacred the
inhabitants.

During the Gulf War, U.S. soldiers liberating

Kuwait City were charged with war crimes, their vindictive
behavior driven by rumors of the suffering of the Kuwatis at
the hands of the Iraqi soldiers.
Over the last few years, even the last few months,
weeks and days, in international conflicts in BosniaHerzegovina and Serbia, Israel, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom, and in civil wars in places like Sri Lanka, Rwanda,
and Liberia, the world has been shocked again and again by
tales of vindictive brutality and murder of civilians at the
hands of military institutions.

Wherever and whenever human

societies lock themselves in mortal combat, the pathology of
revenge produces a litany of names and places that become
synonymous with terror and abject suffering.

Few things

produce more powerful emotions and reflection than news of
military forces attacking defenseless civilian populations
in acts of revenge.
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when people witness a tragedy on the scale of a
vengeful war crime, they are left searching for answers.

As

detailed above, most societies have at their legal base some
form of systemized retribution.

Both Judeo-Christian and

Islamic societies have in their fundamental scriptures
language that legitimizes, or permits revenge.

These

passages are intended to maintain equilibrium among the
individuals of a society.

The doctrine of life for life and

eye for eye maintains this balance through proportional
action and reaction: The severity of the punishment is
determined by the severity of the crime.

When pathological

behavior comes to drive the natural impulse toward revenge,
as seen in the case of Lidice, the proportionality of this
retributive equation is upset, threatening stability within
the parties involved.
It is convenient and comfortable to shrug-off the issue
of revenge in war, evoking the kind of "all's fair" logic
that is so often used to explain-away the horrors of war.
While it is evident from Bok's examination of pathology in
the context of war that human values and behavior are
significantly altered through the experience of war, to

11

simply declare that, "In war, anything makes sense,"
truncates the problem after the fact and lends apathetic
thoughtlessness to the issue.

Many scholars have attempted

to confront complex social and political issues with the
intent on positing a solution--a solution that effects a
change in human nature/behavior through enlightenment.

This

study represents just such an attempt to illuminate the
issue of pathological revenge during war and speculate about
possible solutions.
In order to ascertain the reasons why a Mi Lai or a
Lidice occurred, one of the first appropriate steps would be
an examination of the social values within the societies
enacting the vengeful atrocities.

This analysis will seek

to identify such values by searching for permissive
language--language that increases the possibility of an act
of pathological revenge during times of war.
While it is possible to argue that warring societies
promote acts of brutal revenge on the part of their military
institutions, such an argument, as mentioned above, does not
lend itself to the search for potential remedies.

Even if

it were the goal of this work to illustrate socio-political
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trends in human behavior that promote wartime atrocities, to
claim that human nature, even during war, promotes the
massacre of innocents in the name of revenge is problematic
at the least.

While humans might not necessarily promote

such atrocities, values must exist in any society that
permit nonpathological people to engage in pathological
behavior.

Part of this permission can be found in

contemporary language.

Through the speeches and writing of

national leaders, it is possible to identify certain
permissive values, that can rationalize pathological acts of
revenge.
In examining acts of wartime revenge as they have
occurred in the past, two types become apparent.

All

revenge has the same source--an emotional response to a
transgression committed against a person, an institution, or
both.

After the initial act which precipitates the revenge,

at least two courses of action can go into effect.

In one

case, revenge is immediate and taken without forethought.
Individuals or groups respond instantly and emotionally to a
situation.

The massacre of civilians by U.S. soldiers at Mi

Lai and the conduct of the 1st Marine Division during the
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Gulf War are classic examples of this type of event-driven
revenge.

The soldiers, affected by past events and the

present situation, initiated revenge as individuals, and as
a group acted in concert without having any pre-arranged
plan to do so.
Another type of revenge has the same emotional sources
as the first, but takes a radically different course.
Instead of being an immediate, irrational reaction to a
situation, the actors set a deliberate plan into motion.
Options are weighed, logical targets are selected, and the
revenge is carried out deliberately and systematically,
following a definite plan of action.
This second, deliberate type of revenge is the focus of
this study.

The case of Lidice provides a perfect model of

this well-planned, rational act of pathological retribution.
As described above, Reinhardt Heydrich, the SS commander in
the annexed territories of Bohemia and Moravia, was
assassinated by Czech resistance fighters.

The German

response took the form of the execution or deportation of
the entire population of Lidice and the complete destruction
of the town.

The remarkable issue surrounding the case of
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Lidice is the lapse of time between action and reaction.
Where the massacre at Mi Lai was a process of action and
reaction occurring during a single day, the destruction of
Lidice followed the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich by
thirteen days.
The primary goal of this work is to provide an analysis
of permissive values that undergirded Nazi society--values
that permitted and provided justification for such action.
This thesis rests on the assumption that the Germans, to a
certain extent, acted voluntarily in committing these acts.
While it is true that they were acting under orders, each
soldier in the firing squads, each worker who helped
dismantle the village, and each soldier who sent the women
and children off to concentration camps still, at some
level, had to make an individual decision to participate in
the destruction.

In the absence of some degree of social

permission, the only explanation left to analyze their
motives is individual pathology.

To argue that the forces

arrayed at Lidice were entirely composed of homicidal
maniacs would, of course, be foolish.
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In order to discover these permissive values, this
analysis will combine the disciplines of psychology,
sociology, linguistics, and political theory with historical
analysis.

Chapter II outlines the general methodological

approach.

Using psychology as a base, it is possible to

construct a behavioral model which enables an analysis of
societal pathological behavior and its sources.

Chapter III

provides a contextual analysis of the increasingly
pathological relationship between Germany and the
Czechoslovak Republic between 1918 and 1942 .

Chapter IV, in

part, employs the method developed in Chapter II to examine
the rhetoric of Adolf Hitler for permissive values as they
can be applied to revenge.

Chapter V concludes the analysis

of permission with an examination of human behavior as
manifested and examined in political theory.
While this is a study of a single case in history, it
is in no way intended to advance a description of Nazi
society as being peculiarly permissive toward acts of
revenge.

To do so would promote the erroneous argument of a

Deutscher Sonderweg and, more importantly, it would be an
inappropriate and distasteful treatment of German culture.
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By examining the actions of the Germans at Lidice and, more
importantly, the language of Adolf Hitler, the purpose of
this study is to illuminate institutionalized military
revenge as a universal, species-wide phenomenon among
humans.
This study is intended as a speculative view of the
future of statecraft and military operations as well as an
informative analysis of past events.

Too often the

importance of human emotions and feelings are ignored in
decisions of state.

In this era when global peacekeeping

efforts rely more and more on military issues and
organizations for success, there is a distinct need to
incorporate the study of human emotions into all levels of
the peacekeeping process: From the sweeping policy
negotiations down to front-line troop leadership.

chapter II
Theory and Method: Emotions and Pragmatics

Feelings and emotions--including that of revenge--often
serve as the fundamental forces which drive human behavior.
Our daily conduct is a progression of decisions based upon
our emotional reactions to various stimuli.

When we are

confronted with events that require some sort of reaction or
decision, our subsequent conduct, logical or not, is a
product of our values and thoughtfulness tempered by our
emotions.

During crisis times such as war or natural

disasters, the quality of human emotions can change, leading
in some instances to irrational, or even pathological
decisions.^

As important as feelings and emotions are to

human behavior, treatment of such phenomena is conspicuously
absent both in scholarly analysis of historical events and
the conduct of international affairs, such as treaties.
Another area which lacks sufficient analysis of the role of
human emotions in behavior is the field of military
leadership.

While leadership manuals detail various

^ See Bok above.
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emotional considerations military leaders must address in
order to maintain the combat effectiveness of their troops,
none directly outline the potential affectiveness of
emotions of soldiers upon the manner in which they conduct
combat operations.
In addition to providing an analysis of revenge in war,
this work is intended, in part, to highlight the need for
more detailed treatment of the phenomena of feelings and
emotions in the development and implementation of
international peacekeeping policy.

In order to effectively

address these issues, it is necessary to examine works of
psychological and sociological theory that illuminate the
important role that emotions play in human behavior and the
manner in which emotions, experienced collectively, can
influence political and social decisions and conduct.

By

combining psychological theory with the historical analysis
of international relations, we can draw more complete and
compelling conclusions regarding the influence of feelings
and emotions both at Lidice in 1942, and in the more general
framework of international security and peacekeeping.
One sociologist who has done extensive work in the role
of emotions in human conduct is Thomas Scheff.

His 1994
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work entitled. Bloody Revenge: Emotions. Nationalism, and
War. presents an examination of emotions that produce
vindictive behavior in societies and the manifestations of
these emotions in the outbreak of war.

Scheff bases much of

his work on psychological theories developed by Helen Lewis
in her 1971 book, Shame and Guilt in Neurosis.

Scheff

focuses on Lewis's pioneering work in identifying shame as
one of the primary motivating emotions in human behavior,
and her further development of therapeutic approaches to
problems in personal relationships and psyches caused by
shame.
By analyzing the transcripts of dozens of therapy
sessions, Lewis is able to define the nature of shame in
human emotions, and further describe a pattern of
potentially aggressive and destructive behavior produced by
shame.

She describes a certain level of contact or

"connectedness" among human beings.

Shame can result when

the intensity of that connectedness is significantly
altered, and individuals feel alienated.

If human contact

becomes so intimate that one party feels enveloped, exposed,
or violated, that party experiences some amount of shame.
Likewise, if the contact becomes too remote, a feeling of
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isolation can produce shame.

This breech in human

solidarity can be caused by another person's actions, or an
encounter with other "ill-defined" sources.^

Lewis

describes shame as an acutely painful experience that
results not only in a certain degree of mental anguish, but
physical changes as well.

This physical response to shame

involves agitation resulting from the arousal of internal
organs and kinesthetic feedback.®
Lewis's description of the physiological human
responses to shame closely resembles the phenomenon commonly
described as a "fight or flight" reaction.

Any threat (such

as pain) to the self elicits an agitated response in which
the object of the threat is moved to either retreat from, or
aggressively confront the threat.

The natural desire to

eliminate threats through aggression or flight is a
primitive behavioral defense mechanism.

Lewis addresses the

need for humans to likewise defend themselves from the pain
induced by shame.

When individuals encounter shameful

® Helen B. Lewis, Shame and Guilt in Neurosis (New York:
International Universities Press, Inc., 1971), p. 39. We
can assume Lewis means that shameful emotions are not
exclusively the product of other individuals' actions.
' Ibid.
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situations, as such situations imply some measure of
hostility directed against that individual,' natural
reactions are to either distance themselves from the source
of shame (through hiding, a form of 'flight') or, more
commonly, repress the feelings of shame in an attempt to
ignore them.®
Lewis claims that this phenomenon of "bypassed" shame
leads to neurotic behavior.

The emotion of shame itself can

ultimately redirect the hostile emotions resulting from
shame.

When a person experiences shame from another source,

it is shame and guilt, in the form of rationality, that
diffuses hostility and leads to a nonaggressive resolution
of the confrontation.®

If, in other words, a person is

shamed and acknowledges the validity of the situation, much
as in the case of an embarrassing public critique from a
colleague, that person realizes the further shame and
subsequent guilt that can arise from retaliation.
feel bad for behaving vindictively.

' Ibid, p. 41.
® Ibid, p. 38.
® Ibid.

They will
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If, however, in defense, individuals attempt to deny or
repress their shameful emotions, it is impossible for them
to acknowledge their shame, thereby denying a vent for the
natural physical and mental agitation evoked by shame.

By

internalizing shameful emotions, individuals become more
prone to "discharge" their anxiety in the form of hostility
directed against others.^"

It is this "bypassed" shame,

Lewis argues, which produces vengeful emotions that, in
turn, drive aggressively hostile behavior in an attempt to
exact revenge and humiliate the source of the shame.
For shame to occur there must be an
emotional relationship between the person
[experiencing shameful emotions] and the
"other" [source of shame].... In this
affective tie the self does not feel
autonomous or independent, but dependent and
vulnerable to rejection. Shame is a
vicarious experience of the significant
other's scorn. A "righting" tendency often
evoked by shame is the "turning of the
tables." Evoked hostility presses toward
triumph over or humiliation of the "other,"
i.e., to the vicarious experience of the
other's shame."

" Ibid, pp. 40-41, 44-45, 179, 248-9.
Ibid, p. 46.
Ibid, p. 42.
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Lewis's connection between the experience of shame and
the onset of vengeful emotions is clear.

This affective

relationship between shame and revenge is not a mysterious
puzzle accessible only to scholars of psychoanalytic theory.
We have all experienced the emotional process described by
Lewis.

When we are shamed, embarrassed, or harmed by

another person, part of our natural response contains the
desire at least to seek revenge, if not actual vindictive
behavior.
Expanding on Lewis's theoretical work linking
unacknowledged shame and emotional hostility, Scheff and
Suzanne Retzinger make a close tie between shame and
violent, destructive aggression in their 1991 book. Emotions
and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts.
Using several different types of case studies, Scheff and
Retzinger make a clear case for the commonality of the
shame-hostility cycle in humans and further project this
behavior onto a larger, society-wide canvas.
Part of their study focuses on human solidarity and
alienation.

In an analysis of several different sets of

game show contestants, the reactions to winning and losing
among the two-person teams were nearly identical.

When
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victorious, the contestants would display classic behavioral
cues indicating pride and solidarity: Eye contact, wide-open
eyes, smiling, closeness and actual physical contact.

In

defeat, these same pairs showed signs of shame and
alienation: No eye contact, closed or hidden eyes (an
attempt to hide), physical distancing from one another,
frowns or grimaces.

In a similar study of "victims" of

Allan Funt's comedy show. Candid Camera, the reactions of
the subjects of practical jokes all displayed strikingly
similar shame cues.

They either hid or closed their eyes,

or "shrank" inward in an unconscious attempt to reduce their
size (one man even crawled under a desk); most importantly,
all the subjects displayed excited, agitated behavior.
Combining an analysis of unacknowledged shame and
violent emotions (based on Lewis's theory) with their
analysis of the universal nature of human behavior resulting
from shame and alienation, Scheff and Retzinger develop a
theory of social conflict.

Their theory outlines a process

Thomas J. Scheff and Suzanne M. Retzinger, Emotions and
Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 54-60.
" Ibid, pp. 43-53.

that begins with a stimulus (verbal, linguistic, or
paralinguistic) that evokes shame in a subject(s).

If the

subject is responsive to the shameful stimulus and
acknowledges it, the bond between the subject and the
"other" actually grows stronger, resulting in pride and
solidarity.

If, on the other hand, the subject is not

responsive to the stimulus, alienation develops between the
two parties which quickly develops into a pattern of
pathological revenge.

As a result of their unacknowledged

shame, the subject becomes angry and responds
disrespectfully to the "other" who, in turn, experiences
shame, grows angry, and perpetuates the cycle of revenge.
Scheff and Retzinger add to Lewis's theory of shame and
hostile emotion to illuminate the tie between shame and
violent, aggressive behavior:
Lewis (1971) referred to the internal shamerage process...as "anger bound by shame" or
"humiliated fury."... Shame-rage spirals may
be brief, lasting a matter of minutes, or
they can last for hours, days, or a lifetime,
as bitter hatred or resentment.... Since such
conflicts have no limits [due to the
escalatory nature of pathological
retribution], they may be lethal."
Ibid, pp. 66-69.
Ibid, p. 127.
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In Bloody Revenge. Scheff uses the ideas that he and
Retzinger developed in Emotions and Violence to describe
warfare among nations as a product of shameful emotions as
experienced by a society, and the naturally hostile
discharge of those emotions.

In order to link this

emotional pattern to social behavior, Scheff proposes,
...that when leaders of nations and their
followers face large-scale, emotionally
charged conflicts, they utilize the only
dispute tactics they know--the ones they
learned beneath the level of awareness, in
their families.^'
Scheff is trying to identify the emotional causes of war as
they are evident in human behavior.

These emotions are

products of behavior that individuals learn from the society
within which they live and interact daily.

The emotions

that lead humans to seek revenge through violence, in this
setting, are thus not pathological aberrations, but rather
inherent facets of human behavior.

The consequences of such

emotions in the context of war, however, are often tragic.
As it applies to his study, Scheff maintains an inherent
connection between war (as revenge) and human emotions:

" Scheff, p. 34.
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"...war is not just out there. separate from us; it is also
in here, inside of us."^®
Focusing on the emotions of shame and pride, Scheff
examines the following excerpt from Mein Kampf using Lewis's
analytical style of "discourse analysis" to make his case
for WWII as an emotional act of collective revenge.

Those

words conveying shameful emotions are here italicized and
those which indicate pride are underlined:
Particularly our German people which today
lies broken and defenseless, exposed to the
kicks of all the world, needs that suggestive
force that lies in self-confidence. This
self-confidence must be inculcated in the
young national comrade from childhood on. His
whole education and training must be so
ordered as to give him the conviction that he
is absolutely superior to others. Through
his physical strength and dexterity. he must
recover his faith in invincibility of his
whole people. For what formerly led the
German army to victorv was the sum of the
confidence which each individual had in
himself and all together in their leadership.
What will raise the German people up again is
confidence.
While Hitler is not directly calling for the German

" Ibid, p. 12.
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf trans, by Ralph Manheim,
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1943) p. 411. Also cited in
Scheff, p. 114. [My italics and underlines]
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nation to rise in arms against its enemies, it is clear that
he is implying that "strength and dexterity" will provide
the confidence which, in turn, will lead to victory and a
restoration of Germany's former greatness.

It is not an

unrealistic assumption to connect Hitler's language to his
desire for revenge and satisfaction.

In one aspect,

according to Scheff, World War II was an act of vengeance
directed against Germany's enemies from World War 1
As mentioned above, Lewis examines the role of shame in
producing neurotic behavior in individuals.

Scheff relies

heavily on Lewis's idea of "feeling traps" as well as the
conflict theory outlined in Emotions and Violence to
illuminate social emotions which can produce destructive
behavior.

Lewis describes a feeling trap as a process that

begins with an insult.

This insult immediately produces a

feeling of alienation between the two parties.

This

alienation leads to shame which, should this shame remain
unacknowledged (as described by Lewis), in turn produces
rage and anger.

This anger then leads to aggressive

behavior, and even further to violence as outlined by Scheff

Scheff, pp. 105-123.
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and Retzinger.^^

In Bloody Revenge. Scheff projects this

process of feeling traps upon nation-states to describe
emotional motives for aggressive behavior (war) as a
vengeful response to a collective feeling of alienation and
shame.
While Scheff's case for shame as the prime motivator
for destructive behavior is well-established, his link
between the emotions of individuals and social behavior is
less clear.

Up to this point, the theories examined have

all been based primarily on psychological analyses of
individuals.

As a sociologist, Scheff identifies patterns

in human behavior that indicate communal action resulting
from individual values.

He takes individual emotions and

their effects, and projects them onto a social construct to
explain social behavior.

Scheff justifies this connection

with a seemingly simple, yet very telling illustration of
the historical evolution of shame in society.
In order to establish this connection, Scheff turns to
a 1978 analysis of the evolution of manners by Norbert
Elias.

Elias details the parallel relationship between

Ibid, p. 69.
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modernization and the "civilizing process...[of]
the...moulding of the drive economy that we call 'shame' and
'repugnance' or embarrassment.'"

Scheff emphasized Elias's

analysis of the increasing social concern regarding and
conventions governing "proper" behavior such as table
manners, bodily functions, sexuality and anger.

Elias is

concerned mainly with the connection between the development
of rational thought and modernization.

Even so, his

discussion of the connection between individual shame and
social table manners is a good illustration of the link that
Scheff draws between individual emotions and social
behavior.
In the same vein, Scheff uses an analysis of politeness
to describe the universal nature of social behavior as
driven by individual emotions.

In 1987, Brown and Levinson

examined the common trends in human politeness behavior.
In their analysis. Brown and Levinson discuss universal
trends in language produced by the desire for correct

Scheff, p. 46. He cites Norbert Elias, The History of
Manners (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
" P. Brown and S. Levinson, Politeness Behavior: Some
Universals in Language Usage (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987) .
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etiquette.

As Scheff describes their analysis:

"All known

cultures provide elaborate means for protecting face, that
is, protecting against embarrassment and humiliation."^^

In

light of Elias's analysis, if politeness is a social
behavioral trend aimed at reducing the occurrence of shame
in individuals, then Brown and Levinson expand this idea to
include all societies.

Here, then, (in combination with the

theories developed by Lewis, Retzinger, and Scheff) is an
illustration of the two basic ideas pursued in this
analysis: First, human social values (deriving from a
composite of human emotions) are directly connected to an
individual's decision/ability to participate in
institutional acts of revenge and second, these values are
not peculiar to a certain society (Germany), but are a
universally human phenomenon.
Developing a theory is only half the task of this
project. In order for the theory to have any meaning, it is
necessary to develop a method for analysis.

Scheff provides

the theoretical model upon which this analysis rests.
method, however, is another matter.

Scheff, p. 51.

His

Scheff bases his method
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of language analysis in large part on the Gottschalk-Gleser
Content Analysis Scales.As the title suggests, this work
belongs to the larger field of behavioral study of content
analysis.

Content analysis, according to Gottschalk's

method, is an attempt to quantify and analyze lingual and
written communication as an "essential aspect of all social
interaction, ranging from the interpersonal to the
international levels."^®

Content analysis involves

assigning numerical values to certain words or
constructions,^^ and then numerically quantifying this code
to identify and predict behavioral patterns.

Evidence that

the methods of content analysis embraced by psychologists
and sociologists have influenced a number of historians and
political scientists can be found in the work of Robert

- ^^--Lewis-A. Gottsch^rlkT Carolyn N. Winget, and Goldine C.
Gleser, Manual of Instructions for the Gottschalk-Gleser
Content Analysis Scales: Anxiety. Hostility, and Social
Alienation-Personal Disorganization (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1969).
Ibid, p. 1.
Depending on the type of behavior that the analyst is
attempting to illuminate--anger, shame, hostility,
alienation, et c.--words and constructions will have
different values as the objectives of the analysis change.
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North and his associates.^®

In their handbook, the authors

describe a method for quantifying the text of documents in
order to identify aspects of human behavior that can affect
decision makers and further affect the formulation and
implementation of international policy, especially as it
regards "international crises and the behavior of states in
conflict .
As a method for quantifying text, content analysis is a
valuable analytical tool.

It is a means by which

behavioralists can judge human conduct and make wellinformed predictions based on mathematical probability.
is, however, not without limitations.

It

North claims that his

work is a solution to the enigmatic practice of analyzing
the complex world of international relations through
qualitative methods.

In his introduction. North implies

that qualitative analysis demands a somewhat undisciplined
leap of faith, a plunge "into the dark."^°

Robert C. North, Ole R. Holsti, M. George Zaninovich, and
Dina A. Zinnes, Content Analysis: A Handbook with
Applications for the Study of International Crisis
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963) .
Ibid, p. 3. [emphasis added]
Ibid, p. xiii.
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While this statement is valuable in light of the
strengths as noted above, it is not analytical gospel.

By

reducing the language relative to international decision
making to a numerical code, content analysis places very
definite constraints upon one of the most complex and
bedeviling issues facing modern scholars--human nature.
Though it is a helpful and complicated tool that can be used
to reduce the study of human behavior to numericallygenerated conclusions, content analysis also limits the
latitude necessary for analysts to draw more general
conclusions about universal human behavior.

By relying on

content analysis, scholars roam dangerously close to the
borders of monocausal explanation.

As seen in Scheff's

work, shame alone is heralded as the primary motivation for
the First and Second World Wars.

Any responsible historian

must answer such an assertion with the critique:

"It is not

that simple."
As it pertains to this work on revenge and social
pathology, content analysis is important in that it lends
authority to the role that language plays in the formation
of human values and the conduct of individuals.

While

content analysis is not the primary method employed here, it

35

is important to acknowledge the efforts of those who have,
diligently, emphasized the importance of language through
quantitative examination.

Specific to the goals of this

analysis, content analysis lays the scientific foundation
for analyzing Hitler's rhetoric and extracting parts of his
discourse which indicate shame and/or revenge.
Human emotions and behavior present analysts with such
a diverse and vexing array of variables and possibilities
that content analysis, for all its complexity and
thoroughness, is simply too limiting a method for a broad,
general examination. Content analysis, however, belongs in
part to the larger discipline of linguistic analysis called
pragmatics.

Pragmatics, in turn, is a subfield of

semeiotics, or semantics.

Semeiotics refers to that field

of study dedicated to examining the meaning(s) of words as
those meanings change over time and in certain contexts.
Within the field of semeiotics, pragmatics focuses on the
phenomena of cause and effect as affected by verbal
communication.

T. Givon describes pragmatics as,

an approach to description, to information
processing, thus to the construction,
interpretation and communication of
experience. At its core lies the notion of
context, and the axiom that reality and/or
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experience are not absolute fixed entities,
but rather frame-dependent, contingent upon
the observer's perspective.^^
Pragmatics refers to any study of language that focuses on
the medium of communication, the sender, the interpreter(s),
and the context within which the language is delivered and
received. Concisely defined by Charles W. Morris,
.'pragmatics' is designated the science of the relation
of signs [lingual or textual communication] to their
interpreters."^^

Pragmatics as a discipline contains many

diverse subfields that range from complex coding systems
such as content analysis to less restrictive, looselydefined analyses of the interpretation of metaphor.
Whatever formats or methods, the objectives of all
pragmatic analyses are similar.

Analysts who engage in

pragmatic examination seek to identify and extract

T. Givon, Mind. Code, and Context: Essavs in Pragmatics
(Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1989) p. xvii.
Quoted in, Steven Davis, ed.. Pragmatics: A Reader
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) p. 3.
" See George Lakoff's discussions of pragmatics in
Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1980), and. Women. Fire and Dangerous Things: What
Categories Reveal about the Mind (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1987).
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connotative meaning from their target communication.

One

must be able to differentiate between denotative, or the
direct meaning of communication and the connotative, or
implied meaning of the same communication. All human
communication has the potential to be used to affect both a
direct and indirect understanding of the signs used in
communication.

I will use a hypothetical example to

illustrate this point.

If one person in a room was to say

to another, "It is hot in here, don't you think so?", the
direct meaning of the statement is clear--it is hot in the
room.

If we examine the context within which the statement

is made, however, much more meaning may be gleaned from the
statement.

If the person who spoke is a guest at the second

person's house, the statement can have an implied meaning by
which the first person is trying to get the other to open a
window and cool the room.

If the second person represents

an authoritative figure to the first, the reasons for using
implied communication become more obvious.

The first person

(subordinate) is trying to affect approving action in the
second (dominant) without seeming pretentious, rude, or
insubordinate.
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Connotative meaning does not have to be a direct and
conscious effort as outlined above.

The indirect effects of

language on interpreters are affected by context and
perception.

A politician's speech might have a vast array

of indirect meanings as the speech is perceived and
interpreted by people of differing political views, economic
situations, and religious preferences among others.
Intentional or unintentional, the relationship between
language and its interpreters is not limited to the
perception of denotative meaning.

Communication of meaning

can potentially exist at several levels simultaneously when
language is used.
When examined alongside the writing of such theorists
of international perception and misperception as Robert
Jervis", we can see the usefulness of pragmatics in the
study of relations between states.

While Jervis is mainly

concerned with the ways in which the perception of
individual statesmen affects their attempt to define the
nature of the international system, his work provides a link

Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in
International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1976).
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between the use of pragmatics to discover the hidden
meanings in interpersonal communication and its application
to a larger study of the rhetoric of national leaders and
the values conveyed to/instilled upon the population as they
perceive and interpret the signs used in communication.
Pragmatics, then, provides the general methodological
construct within which to analyze Hitler's rhetoric and its
language of revenge.

As apparent in the discussion above,

this analysis uses pragmatics and many other disciplines to
approach the issue of revenge.

While such an approach runs

the danger of seeming too diverse and undisciplined to
provide ought but a superficial analysis of the material, it
also can be strengthened by the application of many
different points-of-view.

Indeed, this work does not belong

to any one single academic discipline.

It is not purely

history, nor political theory, nor sociology, psychology or
linguistics.

Rather, it borrows from each of these

disciplines to produce an interdisciplinary analysis of one
isolated aspect of the human condition.

As a result, this

work might seem to lack the depth and detail of a strictly
historical monograph.

In its defense, however, where it

lacks depth and detail, it provides breadth and diversity.
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Scholars cannot completely describe the complexities of
human conditions through singular, exclusive disciplines.
Whatever the other, specific definitions of disciplines
within the fields of art and science may be, they all aim to
illuminate some aspect of the human condition.

As content

analysis is too limiting a method to analyze the nebulous
relationship between communication and interpreter, so too
are history, political science, sociology and the rest too
limited to address the complexity of the human experience
when used alone.

In conjunction, however, these disciplines

can combine to provide a new, multifaceted view of the human
condition.
All academic efforts have their peculiar strengths and
weaknesses whether they are used independently from one
another or together.

Paul Lauren analyzes this potential

for marrying history and theory to develop well-informed
policy.

In his article, Lauren plays out the differences in

approach between diplomatic historians and theorists and the
manner in which two disciplines can combine to produce new
thoughts in diplomatic scholarship.

He asserts that through

bleeding the borders of the realms of history and theory,
students of diplomacy can attain a higher level of
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scholarship that will result in "...better history, better
theory, and perhaps, in turn and through use, even better
policy.

Gordon Craig further describes the broadening of

the field of international relations in his article, "On the
Nature of Diplomatic History.As is apparent in this
chapter, the theory and method that provide the foundations
for this study take many different disciplines into account

Paul G. Lauren, "Diplomacy: History, Theory, and
Policy," from Diplomacy: New Approaches in History. Theory.
and Policy. Paul Lauren, ed., (New York: The Free Press,
1979), pp. 3-18.
Gordon Craig, "On the Nature of Diplomatic History:
The Relevance of Some Old Books," from Diplomacy: New
Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy. Paul Lauren, ed.,
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in the hope that it will shed a many-colored light on a
complex issue.

(New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 21-42.

Chapter III
Historical Analysis: The Czechs and the Germans

The act of revenge for Heydrich's death carried out by the
Germans at Lidice was not an isolated incident, rather, it
was part of a continuing string of vindictive reactions.
During the state of emergency which began on May 27, 1942,
the day of Heydrich's assassination, and ended September,
1942, the Germans would arrest and execute over one thousand
Czechs and murder or deport the populations of two villages
in revenge for the loss of their leader.^

From 1918 to 1942

animosity between Czechoslovakia and Germany increased in
intensity from the mild tension common among neighboring
states, especially in the wake of a war, to pathological
partisanship.

The tragedy of Lidice constituted one small

facet of a larger process of reciprocity that began with the
Treaty of Versailles and continued to the end of World War
II.

While it was a minor factor in the vengeful process of

^ On July 24, 1942, the tiny Czech village of Lezaky was
burned down. All the inhabitants, men and women (33 persons
total) were shot because they had offered shelter to Czech
resistance agents. Radomir Luza, The Transfer of the
Sudeten Germans (New York: New York University Press, 1964),
p. 210.
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Czech-German relations before and during the German
occupation of Czechoslovakia, the destruction of Lidice
further represents a singular event within the total process
of revenge meted out by the Nazis in direct retaliation for
Heydrich's death.
Historians examining the revenge of the Germans at
Lidice must view this event from the larger framework of not
only World War II, but also the history of Czech-German
relations from the creation of Czechoslovakia in 1918 to
that fateful Spring of 1942.

Here, one can clearly see a

larger pattern of action and vengeful reaction dating from
the close of World War I, and thus set the stage for what
would occur.
Since the end of World War I, historians have described
the peace imposed by the Allies as a vindictive, punitive
peace designed to punish the Central Powers for initiating a
war which caused unparalleled destruction throughout Europe.
In a style similar to the 1918 peace forced by Germany upon
Russia at Brest-Litovsk, Germany was forced to pay for the
damage wrought by the war in a variety of ways.

The

John Wheeler-Dennett, Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace.
March. 1918 (London: Macmillan & Co., 1956), p. 405.
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Allies required Germany to pay M20,000,000,000 to the Allies
in 1919-1920.

Equivalent annual payments were further

mandated until all international claims against Germany were
dropped."

Negotiators at the Paris Peace conference

further declared that the nations of Europe had the right to
demand from Germany payment in kind of any material lost,
broken, or destroyed as a result of the war.

France alone

demanded 30,000,000 tons of coal delivered per annum
throughout the period of European reparation.
Furthermore, Allied negotiators demanded that Germany turn
over to the Allies the whole of her shipping fleet weighing
over 1,600 tons gross; half of her vessels between 1,600 and
1,000 tons; and one-quarter of her steam trawlers and other
fishing craft.In total, German war reparations were set
by the Allies at 25 per cent, of Germany's gross national

" Philip Burnett, The Paris Peace Conference History and
Documents: Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference from the
Standpoint of the American Delegation Second Subcommittee of
the Commission on Reparation of Damage: Minutes of the
Thirty-Second (and Final) Meeting, April 19, 1919, Annex I
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1940) p. 751.
Ibid, p. 746.
" Ibid, p. 751.
Ibid, Annex II, p. 754.
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product to be paid between 1920 and 1921 alone.
The retribution exacted by the Allies in the treaty of
Versailles, while totally debilitating in economic terms,
was not limited to financial responsibility.

In addition to

requiring reparation payments, the Allies ordered Germany to
demobilize her military, placed strict limits upon her
maritime production and activity, and ordered the country to
accept temporary military occupation of the Saar by the
French.

In addition, the treaty forced Germany to give up

territory in the west to France, in the East to Poland and
Czechoslovakia, and overseas to a variety of victors.
Beyond all these physically retributive measures, however,
the negotiators at Versailles exacted a measure of
psychological revenge as well.

Germany was forced, by the

terms of the Treaty, to accept full moral responsibility for
World War I.^^

Through reparations, occupation, territorial

concessions and humiliation, the Treaty of Versailles
represented an act of revenge by the Allies in response to a
perceived relationship between German aggression and the
onset of the most destructive war ever fought up to that

" Ibid, p. 744.
" Ibid, pp. 66-77.
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time .
One of the most significant consequences of the Treaty
of Versailles was the creation of new nation states
throughout Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the
Middle East.

In the wake of the dissolved Hapsburg and

Hohenzollern Empires, the Allies created the new nations of
Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia.

This final act of

creating sympathetic allied states on the borders furthered
obvious geopolitical tension between Germany and the Allies.
It also created ethnic tension which would eventually
provide Hitler with convenient excuses and emotional
rhetoric enough to justify the annexation of Czechoslovakia
in 1939.
In his analysis of revenge, Scheff examines the
language of Adolf Hitler to display the emotions necessary
to explain World War II as an act of revenge on the part of
the Germans.

They acted in retribution for the humiliation

and economic ruin of Germany resultant from the punitive
peace at Versailles.

Anyone who has read Mein Kampf could

arrive at a similar conclusion.

Hitler was obsessed with

regaining lost German honor and was convinced that the means
to secure that honor was the military defeat of its former
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enemies.
Czechoslovakia, in particular, posed a serious problem
for Hitler in his plans to establish a new world order.
Czechoslovakia symbolized the three aspects of European
society most hated by Hitler.

As a creation of the Treaty

of Versailles, the very existence of an independent Czech
state served as a constant reminder of the Diktat. or
dictated peace, and emphasized the postwar humiliation of
the German people.

Czechoslovakia also occupied lands

traditionally dominated by German-speaking Austrians before
World War I.

Finally, Czechoslovakia boasted a liberal

western democracy, a style of government Hitler simply
detested.
Central to the Czech problem was the issue of the
Sudeten Germans.

When the Allies created Czechoslovakia,

they included within its borders territory on the frontiers
of Germany populated primarily by ethnic Germans.

With the

political collapse of the Hapsburg Empire and the economic
ruination of Germany, the industrial and economic dominance
of Germany and Austria-Hungary came to an end.

The primary

benefactor from this dissolution in Central Europe was the
new Czechoslovak Republic.

The nation, which before the
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collapse of Austria-Hungary had represented only 26.4 per
cent of the population of the Empire, now inherited over 70
per cent of its industrial infrastructure.^®

The Czechs

moved to continue to modernize the their industrial base.
While the early days of the new Republic were marked by a
definite German dominance of capital, the efforts of the
Czechs between 1918 and 1929, combined with the economic
disintegration of the Weimar Republic ended an era of German
economic hegemony throughout central Europe.^®
This new economic situation shifted the financial
dependence of Sudeten German industrialists from Germany to
Czechoslovakia.

By the time of the German economic collapse

of 1931, German banks in Czechoslovakia could no longer
serve the needs of Sudeten industrialists who, as a result,
became almost completely reliant on the strong Czech economy
for sustenance.

The bond formed between the Czechs and

the Sudeten Germans between 1918 and 1939 was, in economic

Radomir Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans: A
Study of Czech-German Relations. 1933-1962 (New York: New
York University Press, 1964), p. 7.
Ibid, p. 9. Luza estimates the proportion of Czech and
German banking capital at 75 per cent and 25 per cent
respectively in 1929.
Ibid, p. 10.

50

terms, quite strong/®

Any attempt by Hitler to turn the

Sudeten Germans against the Czech government would be
difficult due to the interdependence of the ethnic groups in
the Sudetenland and the subsequent prosperity resulting from
those ties.
In spite of the strong economic ties between Czechs and
Germans, other problems arose within the newly created state
that served to drive a wedge between the Sudeten Germans and
the Czechs in the years between 1919 and 1939.

The

resulting ethnic division of the population ultimately
pushed ethnic tensions to a crisis point, enabled the rise
of the Nazi Party in Czechoslovakia, and paved the road for
Hitler's conquest of the nation in 1939.
One such problem began in 1919 with the passage of the
Land Reform Law.

In an attempt to break the feudal mold and

modernize land ownership in the new State, Czech authorities

"The [Sudeten] German industrialists feared that an
incorporation into Germany might result in a decline and
extinction of their industries, which were unable to compete
with the much more advanced industries of Germany.
Instinctively, the [Sudeten] German population disliked the
idea of being cut off from their Czech hinterland and
[incorporated in the German economy]. J.W. Breugel, "The
Germans in Pre-War Czechoslovakia." in A History of the
Czechoslovak Republic. 1918-1948 Victor Mamety and Radomir
Luza, eds., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
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created the Land Office within the Czechoslovak Ministry of
Agriculture/®

This office provided oversight of land

redistribution throughout Czechoslovakia.

From the onset of

land reform in 1919, accusations arose from the Sudeten
population of unfair and discriminatory treatment.

Germans

in the Sudeten borderlands alleged that nearly 400,000 ha
(hectares) of land had been taken from German aristocrats
and given to Czechs.^"

Although the Czech government

attempted to placate the Germans by stressing that nearly
200,000 more ha had been taken from Czechs than from
Germans,®^ this redistribution was nonetheless perceived as
unfair by the Germans.

Furthermore, land reform in the

Sudetenland also changed the ethnic make-up of a region
traditionally dominated by ethnic Germans.®^

Luza, p. 10.
Ibid, pp. 10-11.
It is important to note that this figure comes from
redistribution across the whole of Czechoslovakia, not just
the Sudetenlands.
While Czechoslovakia had been ruled before World War I by
the Austrian Hapsburg dynasty, and not by Germany, the
German-speaking population of the Sudetenlands fell, in the
rhetoric of Hitler and the Nazis, under the general rubric
of Germandom--the ethnic German Nation whose destiny it was
to rule Central Europe.
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Divisive issues generated by the reapportionment of
land by the new Czech government continued to develop
throughout the 1920's into a fierce struggle for land
between Czechs and Germans throughout the Sudetenland.
Radomir Luza, a former Czech resistance fighter, now
teaching in the U.S. describes the atmosphere of
intensifying conflict:
[The Germans and Czechs] fought over even the
smallest parcel of land, over every building
lot and home property. The Germans were
mostly on the defensive, with German landed
property often passing without government
interference into Czech ownership. ...For
many of [the Germans] their relationship with
the Czechs had been [before 1918] that of
master and servant, and they could not yet
believe that their former "servants" had
reached full political, economic, social, and
cultural maturity.
The potential for a crisis evolving from the land
reform movement of 1919 is clear, with the most obvious
issue being the perceived injustice of the process as seen
by the Germans.

The per capita confiscation and

readjustment of German property in the Sudetenland seems
unproportionately larger than the amount of land being

Ibid, pp . 12 -13 .
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redistributed from the Czech aristocracy.^^

In addition to

the imbalance, perceived at least, in land redistribution,
the inversion of the traditional social relationship between
Czechs and Sudeten Germans raised new emotional problems.
In their eyes, the Sudeten Germans had been robbed of their
privileged position in the social hierarchy of Central
Europe.

For the Germans in Czechoslovakia, in lieu of the

problems rising from Czech land reform and the
social/emotional loss of their previous privileged status,
the Czech state created by the Treaty of Versailles began to
embody the consequences of Hitler's proclaimed "stab in the
back."
By the end of the 1920's, although Czechs and Germans
in Czechoslovakia had an economically symbiotic
relationship, bitterness and ethnic tension intensified
throughout the Sudetenland.

The Germans claimed lack of

adequate representation in the Czech government while the
government answered such accusations with statistics and
assertions which failed to address the real problems in the
Sudetenland.

The financial collapse of 1929 pushed these

A mere 200,000 more ha throughout all of Czechoslovakia.
See note #14 above.

54

German-Czech tensions even further toward a crisis.
Throughout Czechoslovakia the depression shook the
industrial foundations of the new Republic.

Relevant to the

Sudeten issue was the widespread perception among the German
population that economic distress in Czechoslovakia was most
evident in German industrial areas.

Luza describes the

atmosphere of the depression as a climate within which the
language of political extremists took hold among the
distressed German population of Czechoslovakia:
As the catastrophic slumps of the years 1930-33
assumed greater proportions, the social and
political structure of the borderlands underwent
changes that made the people respond more easily
to radical programs which promised early and easy
improvement.
Luza is of course referring to the forces of Communism and
Nazism.

After several unsuccessful attempts at establishing

a Nazi Party in Czechoslovakia, many of which were thwarted
by Czech officials, a high school gym teacher by the name of
Konrad Henlein was able to consolidate the National
Socialist movement in Czechoslovakia (thenceforth called the
"Sudeten German Party") and establish himself at its head.

Ibid, p. 15.
Ibid, pp. 15-16.
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acting with the direct support of Adolf Hitler.

After

Hitler's rise to power in 1933, Henlein and the Nazis of
Czechoslovakia gained a powerful voice in the increasingly
volatile situation in the Sudetenland.
The depression unleashed into Central Europe forces of
belligerent and intolerable government.

In Czechoslovakia,

the rise of the Nazi party increased the troublesome nature
of the Sudeten question as the Germans there became more
vocal and aggressive in their quest for autonomy.

On May

13, 1936, the Czechoslovak government passed the National
Defense Act in an attempt to get a handle on the impending
crisis in the Sudetenland.

Through this law, the government

acquired extensive powers over industries essential to
national security.

The government acquired the right to

dismiss from their work all persons "unreliable in the eyes
of the State.In January of 1937, the Czech government
declared through the "Machnik Decree" that it claimed the
right to limit the number of Sudeten German employees in

U.S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign
Policy. 1918-1945: Series D (1937-1945) Volume II. Germany
and Czechoslovakia. 1937-1938 report from Ernst Eisenlohr,
the German Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, to the German
Foreign Ministry, October 11, 1937, (Washington: GPO, 1946),
p. 12 .
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firms applying for government contracts.^®

At the end of

June, 1937, the government passed a further law, against the
opposition of the Sudeten German Party, which made military
training compulsory for all citizens of Czechoslovakia, to
include women.®®
The promulgation of the National Defense Law and the
further mobilization of the Czech nation evoked loud
criticism from the Sudeten German population.

On October

11, 1937, Ernst Eisenlohr, the German Foreign Ministry
Representative in Prague, sent a report to the German
Foreign Ministry in Berlin in which he listed several
grievances filed against the Czech government by Germans.
At the head of the list were several complaints stemming
from the administrative treatment of Germans by the
government under the auspices of the National Defense Act.
The letter specifically mentioned expulsions, refusals of
labor permits, and the seizure of German real estate in the
name of national security.

Furthermore, the letter cited

discrimination against the Nazi Party in Czechoslovakia to

Ibid, letter from Konrad Henlein to the German Foreign
Minister (Eisenlohr), November 9, 1937, p. 51.
" Ibid.
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include censorship of Party literature and an outright ban
on Mein Kampf.^°

Eisenlohr criticized the duplicity in

Czech President Eduard Benes's rhetoric and policy:
...President Bens had demanded [of the
Sudeten Germans] a better knowledge of the
Czechs. How was it possible to get to know
each other if every statement on what today
is engrossing all Germany is nervously kept
from the eyes of the Czechoslovak people?®^

On October 17, 1937, the tension between the Sudeten
German Party and the Czech government turned violent.

Karl

Herman Frank, State Secretary in the Reich Propaganda
Ministry, was arrested during a Party function at TelpitzSchoengau.

The German press in Czechoslovakia

sensationalized the incident and published fictional
accounts of a truncheon attack launched against members of
the Party.

In his report to Berlin, Eisenlohr described

the incident as a Czech reaction caused by their increasing
concern over the rise of Hitler in Germany and the Nazis'
activities in Czechoslovakia: "...the conviction has been

Ibid, p. 11.
" Ibid, p. 15.
Ibid, report from Eisenlohr to the German Foreign
Ministry, October 22, 1937, p. 20.
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strengthened in the government and in wide circles of the
population that even more must be done...for the security of
the Republic, internally and externally.""

The incident at

Telpitz-Schoengau caused ripples in the Nazi Party felt by
the elite of the Party.

Hitler's propaganda minister,

Joseph Goebbels, ordered an anti-Czech campaign which
flooded Party newspapers throughout Central Europe with
anti-Czech propaganda from October 17 to November 3, 1937.®^
By the end of 1937, Czechs and Sudeten Germans had
effectively withdrawn into two partisan camps: The Czechs
supported by President Benes and the Czechoslovak
Government, and the Sudeten Germans backed by Hitler and the
Third Reich.

In December, 1937, at Jaegerndorf in

Northeastern Moravia, the Czech Government evoked the
National Defense Act in a massive expropriation of tenants
and landowners.

On December 18, members of the Foreign

Ministry in Berlin met to discuss reciprocal countermeasures
to be taken against Czech nationals living in Germany:
It was argued that 28 orders of expropriation
should be issued along the same lines of
Ibid, p. 21. [emphasis added]
Ibid, minute from the German Foreign Ministry, Berlin,
November 3, 193 7, p. 29.
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procedure as was provided for in the
Czechoslovak National Defense Law, and that
120 summary dismissals should be ordered.®®
The deadline for the execution of these reprisals was set
for February 1, 1938, with the writs of expulsion to be
delivered by Christmas.®®

On December 22, the initial

reprisals were ordered by the Government of the Third
Reich.

On that same day, Adolf Hitler proposed that the

ratio of reprisals against Czech nationals be increased from
1:1 (with relation to the expropriations at Jaegerndorf) to
2:1.®'

Throughout 193 8, this pathological atmosphere of
reciprocity between Czechs and Germans gained fearful
momentum.

In March, 500,000 Germans staged demonstrations

throughout the Sudetenland.

Their demands for autonomy

within the borders of Czechoslovakia were a well-established
rallying cry of the Sudeten German Party.®®

On April 2,

Ibid, minute from the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin,
December 18, 1937, p. 77.
®® Ibid.
®^ Ibid, letter from the German Foreign Ministry to the
German Legation in Czechoslovakia, December 22, 1937, p. 92.
®® Ibid, minute from the German Foreign Ministry, December
22, 1937, p. 93.
Ibid, report from Eisenlohr to the German Foreign

60

Eisenlohr reported to the German Foreign Ministry that the
Government had begun supplying Czechs living in the
Sudetenland with arms.

At the same time, the Sudeten

German Party called for the establishment of a uniformed
German volunteer force in the Sudetenland.^^

On April 9,

1938, Eisenlohr filed the following report to the German
Foreign Ministry:
Feelings becoming more violent in last few
days in Sudeten area. K.H. Frank's
secretary...described situation as
"catastrophic and shattering." All classes
of population from manufacturers to
unemployed openly characterize negotiations
of Sudeten German Party with Czechoslovak
Government...as betrayal. Nor would autonomy
protect Sudeten German area.... Tension is
so great that a single shot for Sudeten
Germans would start blood bath among
Czechs .

Ministry, March 31, 1938, p. 209.
Ibid, report from Eisenlohr to the German Foreign
'Ministry, April 2, 1938, pp. 213-214.
Ibid, letter from the German Foreign Ministry to
Eisenlohr, April 6, 1937, 215. The German Foreign Ministry
asked Eisenlohr to convey their wishes to the Sudeten German
Party that the formation of such a militia be postponed for
the present. Plans were already in the making for the
legitimate annexation of the Sudetenland, and an outright
civil war in the region would not have served the intentions
of the Reich.
Ibid, report from Eisenlohr to the German Foreign
Ministry, April 9, 1938, p. 226.
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The fragmented and desperate nature of Eisenlohr's
message was not lost on Hitler.

As will be discussed in

Chapter 4, Hitler used the tense situation in Czechoslovakia
as an excuse for the further need to protect the "members of
the German Nation" living outside the borders of Germany.
A pattern for pathological revenge was thus, by April,
1938, well established between Czechoslovakia and Germany.
This vindictive pattern had roots in pre-Versailles Europe.
Although Czech officials declared the opposite, and the
actions of many seemed to be genuine, even apologists for
the behavior of the Czech government during the first years
of the Republic must admit that the Czechs discriminated
against the Germans living in their country.

Among other

sources, this discrimination undoubtedly arose from a desire
among the freshly-independent Czech nation for retribution
for centuries of domination by and "servitude"^^ to the
German nation.

If we return to the language of Thomas

Scheff, the desire among Czechs for reprisals against the

See J.W. Breugel, "The Germans in Pre-War
Czechoslovakia," in A History of the Czechoslovak Republic.
1918-1948 Victor Mamety and Radomir Luza, eds. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 169-170, 173, 185,
187.
See Kennan below.
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Sudeten Germans could be a product of "shameful" emotions
caused by generations of German "envelopment."

As a natural

process of healing, the Czechs, even without the entirely
punitive backdrop created by the peace Diktat of 1918 would
have been naturally compelled to exact some form of revenge
against the Germans to atone for their own subjugation and
humiliation.

The Treaty of Versailles simply supplied

legitimacy and amplified the idea of revenge directed
against the Germans.

Any action thus taken by the Czechs

subsequently caused shameful emotions to build up within the
German population of Czechoslovakia, emotions that would, in
turn, undoubtedly manifest themselves in aggressive,
vindictive behavior.
The next step in this cycle of revenge was not far-off.
Hitler was ready for the forceful annexation of the Central
European lands^l^st to_the "German Nation" in the Treaty of
Versailles.

Czechoslovakia was part of this territory

targeted as Lehensraum, or living space.

In September of

1938, the very Western Allies who had created Czechoslovakia
in 1918 now withdrew their promised support at the infamous
Munich Conference and actually authorized Hitler to occupy
the Sudetenland.

Once he secured that territory. Hitler
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then set to work threatening the Czechoslovak government
into capitulation and the surrender of the entire country to
German forces.

In March of 1939, with the total military

abandonment of Czechoslovakia by her Western allies (most
notably Britain and France) the government of President
Benes fled into exile.

Hitler coerced the new regime under

President Emil Hacha to consent to Nazi "protection," and
proceeded to occupy the country, renaming it the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and appointing SS
Obengruppenfuehrer Konstantin von Neurath at the
Reichsprotector of Bohemia and Moravia.

Czechoslovakia thus

ceased to exist.
The Germans immediately set out to establish themselves
in the role of "masters," reclaiming social superiority for
the Sudeten Germans.

A superiority that these members of

Hitler's "German Nation" had enjoyed in the Austrian
Hapsburg Empire until 1918.

In material terms, the Germans

began to reclaim property to which they perceived they had a
traditional claim.

George Kennan wrote in 1940 that the

Czechs estimated that the value of property requisitioned by
the Germans in one year of occupation at 22,000,000,000
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Crowns, or between $500,000,000 and $1,000,000,000.^^
Furthermore, the idea of Lebensraum was manifested by the
Germans in an increase in settlement.

Shortly before the

occupation, the population of Bohemia and Moravia was
estimated at 6,804,000, of whom only 234,000 were ethnic
Germans.

By March of 1940, the total population of the

Protectorate stood at 7,200,000.

Of the Czechs originally

living in the area, nearly 150,000 had relocated to Germany
following the occupation.

This would mean an influx of

nearly 500,000 Germans to the Protectorate in just one year,
bringing the total number of Germans to nearly 800,000, of
which some 120,000 lived in Prague alone.

Across the

country, Czechs were forced out of high-level corporate,
professional, and governmental positions.

Furthermore, the

Germans began to place limits on education and training
programs for young Czechs in an effort to stifle the
progressive potential for future generations of Czechs.^'
In short, a new German elite replaced Czech in the new

" George Kennan, From Prague after Munich: Diplomatic
Papers. 1938-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1968), p. 228.
Ibid, p. 232.
" Ibid, p. 234.
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Protectorate in the course of one year.
The German immigration also forced Czech culture out of
the mainstream.

Once an active part of the creative process

in Central Europe, famous for music, literature, and cinema,
Czech culture was reduced to the quiet cultivation of the
language and artistic roots.

The cinema industry in

Czechoslovakia was totally Germanized, theater became "a
sort of shrine for historical pageantry.

Of Czech

culture under the German occupation, George Kennan said the
following:
Popular imagination finds its expression
mostly in the innumerable bitter jokes and
rhymes and plays on words in which the
average Czech seeks solace for his plight and
which pass from mouth-to-mouth with a
rapidity that even press and radio could
scarcely improve on.^®
With their nation occupied and themselves subjugated
politically, economically, and culturally, the Czechs could
have capitulated mentally in 1940, as the Protectorate
government under Emil Hacha compelled them to do.

However,

much in the same way that Germany had reacted to its
humiliation by the allies following World War I and had

Ibid, p. 235.
" Ibid.
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subsequently sought satisfaction through revenge, however,
the Czechs reacted vengefully to the German presence in
their lands.

A resistance movement emerged in the wake of

occupation which conducted limited but continuous operations
against the German occupation forces throughout the war.
From the beginning of the resistance movement, Czech
freedom fighters kept direct contact with the exiled
government of President Benes, located in London.

Indeed,

throughout the occupation Benes encouraged the resistance
movement through media broadcasts and propaganda
publications.

In a speech broadcast to the Czech people on

June 24, 1941, Benes declared that "at the decisive moment
we shall call you to the struggle which we are waging here
with weapon in hand.

Continue to remain united!"®"

For the

first few years of the war, the Czech resistance largely
served as an intelligence gathering apparatus for the
Allies.

In the Spring of 1941, for example, Czech

operatives accurately relayed the date for the onset of
Operation BARBAROSSA, or the German invasion of Russia, to

Transcript of Speech delivered by E. Benes to the Czech
people, June 24, 1941, Great Britain, Public Record Office,
Foreign Office, 371 series, #30841 [hereafter cited as
Britain, PRO/FO].
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the Soviets.®^
With the entrance of the Soviet Union into the war,
hopeful Czechs grew to expect an early victory for the
Allies.

In the Fall of 1941, the Czech resistance initiated

several campaigns against the Germans.®^

The resistance

movement took the form of active acts of sabotage and
boycott, as well as covert acts of industrial sabotage in
the factories.

Reinhard Heydrich, then Deputy

Reichsprotector, confessed in late 1941 that the new wave of
resistance posed a definite threat to the unity of the
Reich.

In response to the new aggressive behavior of the

Czech resistance. Hitler replaced Neurath with Heydrich as
the Reichsprotector of Bohemia and Moravia.

Heydrich

immediately proclaimed martial law in the Protectorate and
invested himself with absolute executive authority.

In a

speech whereby Heydrich declared a state of emergency, he
announced that:

Galium MacDonald, The Killing of SS-Obergruppenfuhrer
Reinhard Heydrich (New York: The Free Press, 1989), pp. 7079 addresses the connection between the British S.O.E. and
the Czech resistance, and p. 103 describes the accuracy of
Czech intelligence.
Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans p. 207.
®' Ibid.
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All actions violating public order, security,
economic life or peaceful work, as well as
the intentional possession of firearms or
explosives or ammunition are subject to
martial law... Whoever learns of such action
or intentions without immediately reporting
them...is also guilty and thus subject to
martial law.®^
The day following Heydrich's declaration, six people
were executed.

From that point forward, daily executions

were a regular occurrence throughout the Protectorate.
During the night of October 7-8, 1941, less than one month
after Heydrich declared martial law, over 800 instructors
and staff from the Czech Sokol were arrested.

Within eight

months of the "state of emergency," only 60 to 70 of them
were left alive.®®

This new and brutal wave of retaliation

by the Nazi administration in retaliation for Czech
resistance earned Heydrich the title of the "Butcher of
Prague."
In response^foTT^drich's brutal system of repression,
the exiled Czech government in London, in close
collaboration with the British S.O.E.,®® developed and

Ibid, pp. 207-208.
Ibid, p. 209.
Special Operations Executive: British special forces.
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launched Operation ANTHROPOD.

In January of 1942,

Czechoslovakian Army Sergeants Jan Kubis and Josef Gabcik
parachuted into the Protectorate with orders to assassinate
Heydrich.®^

Once in Prague, the two agents found shelter in

a series of safe houses established by JINDRA, a central
contact organization of Czech agents that provided mutual
security and support.
On May 27, 1942, Gabcik and Kubis set an ambush for
Heydrich's staff car on a Prague street corner.

As

Heydrich's car slowed to make the turn, Gabcik stepped out
and attempted to fire his automatic rifle.
malfunctioned.

His weapon

Kubis, on the opposite side of the street,

hurled a bomb at the car which exploded, sending shrapnel
into Heydrich's back.

Although both Heydrich and his driver

drew their weapons and attempted to pursue the attackers,
Gabcik and Kubis escaped to JINDRA safe houses.

Heydrich

was rushed to a hospital where he underwent emergency
surgery to repair the internal damage inflicted by the bomb.
He developed an infection, and died of his wounds on June 4,
1942

MacDonald, pp. 123-125.
MacDonald, pp. 169-173.

Gunther Deschner, Reinhard
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The German reaction to Heydrich's assassination was
instantaneous.

Karl Hermann Frank, Heydrich's immediate

successor, declared a state of emergency, ordering that
anyone guilty of aiding the assassins, indeed, anyone who
condoned the act, be shot.

Frank announced a reward of

20,000,000 Crowns (about $300,000) for the return of the
assassins and began to exact revenge for the attack.

By

June 5, some 170 people had already been executed by the
Nazis for alleged connections to the attack.®®

Frank made

the intended extent of the Nazi revenge clear in a
declaration in which he publicly announced that German
authorities would execute not only the attackers, but their
families and associates as well.®"

Frank left Prague to

personally report the situation to Hitler in Berlin, leaving
Kurt Daleuge to assume the responsibilities of the office of
Reich Protector.

Daleuge immediately ordered that all Czech

citizens report to the Nazi authorities to have their

Heydrich: A Bioaraphv (New York: Stein and Day, 1977), pp.
240-241.
Report No. XIX from Eduard Benes regarding the Political
situation in the Protectorate, 23rd May to 5th June, 1942,
June 6, 1942, Britain, PRO/FO 371 series, #30837.
Ibid.
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identification cards stamped.

Failure to comply meant

execution. Across the Protectorate, more than 5,000
communities underwent stringent house-by-house searches;
more than four million citizens reported to German checkstations; more than one thousand were arrested, some six
hundred of whom were summarily executed.®^
Hitler's reaction to the news of Heydrich's death was
even more emotional and extreme.

He ordered that 30,000

disloyal Czechs should be executed if Heydrich's assassins
managed to escape capture.

Though Frank was able to

dissuade Hitler on the grounds that the Czech reaction to
such a massacre would make the German position in the
Protectorate untenable, the 'reign of terror' subsequently
imposed by the German military instituted a program of
deliberate revenge.

By the end of the state of emergency in

September, 3,188 Czechs had been arrested, and 1,357
executed.®^

Julius Fuchik, a journalist imprisoned by the

Germans in Prague, described the German reaction to the
assassination as he experienced it in prison:
The route from Pankrac to the Petschek Palace
Luza, p. 209.
Ibid, pp. 210-211.
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[Gestapo headquarters] and back now becomes
the daily Calvary for thousands of prisoners.
The SS men, acting as overseers in cars, are
taking revenge for Heydrich, Already before
the prison car has made it the first mile,
blood of dozens of prisoners is flowing from
their bruised faces and mouths beaten with
pistol butts....
...Every night one hears the roll call
downstairs in the corridor. Fifty, a
hundred, two hundred people whom they will
load bound hand and foot into lorries... for
mass executions. The guilt? ...they are not
guilty. They were arrested, they are in no
way connected with any of the major cases,
neither are they needed for further
investigations; they are, therefore, suited
for death...
Fuchik goes on to describe the discriminate killing of
Czech prisoners at the hands of the police.

Although his

work must be analyzed very critically (he was, after all, a
condemned prisoner of the German occupation forces), his
description of the German process of revenge for Heydrich's
assassination is important.

He implies that the Germans

intended to kill a certain number of Czechs (at least, as
many as was practical), and that the majority of these
people were killed because their usefulness in ongoing
investigations was minimal.

In other words, what Fuchik

" Julius Fuchik, Notes from the Gallows. (New York: Gibbs
Smith, 1990) pp. 72-74. Fuchik was executed by the Germans
on September 8, 1943.
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wants us to believe is that the Czech arrested in direct
connection to the Heydrich investigation would live to see
the completion of the investigation while the Czech arrested
for a minimal offense such as expired identification papers
was slated for execution.

Though Fuchik's motivation for

writing such a passage is perhaps driven by his own desire
for revenge against the Germans, he does raise an important
point.

The execution of Hitler's orders was deliberate and

careful; Czechs had to die to atone for Heydrich's death,
but only those Czechs not essential to continuing
investigations were killed during the Summer of 1942.
On June 15, 1942, Sergeant Karel Curda, one of the
Czech operatives, surrendered to the German authorities.
From the information he provided, the Nazis were able to
locate and raid several JINDRA safe houses, and further
learned that seven parachutists, including Heydrich's
assassins, were hiding in the Orthodox Church of St. Charles
Borromeo in Prague.

On June 18, over 700 Waffen-SS troops

surrounded and searched the church.

The German troops

discovered the Czechs and, after a long and bitter fire
fight which lasted most of the day, all seven Czech agents,
running out of ammunition, committed suicide.

Curda
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identified the bodies of Kubis and Gabcik as Heydrich's
assassins.

In retaliation, the Nazis tortured and executed

252 members of the assassins' families along with other
Czechs who had aided JINDRA.

In addition to the families

and associates of the assassins, the Germans executed Bishop
Gorazd, the Orthodox Bishop in Prague, along with several
other members of the Orthodox clergy.

In one final act of

revenge for the assassination, the Nazis dissolved the
Orthodox Church in the Protectorate in October, 1942.®^
The most infamous act of revenge committed by the
German military occurred at the small mining village of
Lidice.

On June 8, 1942, Himmler remarked: "It is simply

our duty to avenge the death of Heydrich.Less than 24
hours later, on the evening of June 9, Frank telephoned the
SS in Prague with the following orders regarding Lidice:
1 All adult male inhabitants are to be shot;
2 Females are to be evacuated to a
concentration camp.
3 The children are to be collected together;
if capable of Germanization, they are to
be
delivered to SS-families of the Reich,
MacDonald, p. 197.
p. 212.

Luza, Transfer of the Sudeten Germans

Report No. XX from Eduard Bene_ regarding the Situation
on the Protectorate from 7 to 12 June, 1942, June 12, 1942,
Britain, PRO/FO 371 series, #30837.
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and
the rest are to undergo a different
education;
4 The place is to be burnt down and razed to
the ground.®®
The German military executed the orders with terrifying
efficiency.

As described in the introduction, the Germans

surrounded the village on the evening of June 9.

They

allowed the workers returning from their jobs to enter the
Lidice, but none could leave.

The Germans established

roadblocks and moved into the town.

They loaded the women

and children onto trucks and took them to the high school in
nearby Kladno to await deportation to concentration camps.
They assembled the men at a farmhouse and there executed
them.

The Germans then set the village ablaze and

demolished the ruins with explosives.

All told, the Germans

killed 199 people in Lidice; 143 of the 184 women survived
the concentration camps to return after the war; of the 98
children of Lidice only 16 could be identified and contacted
after the war.

In order to drive home the message of

revenge, the destruction of Lidice continued for four months
following the initial retaliation as the Reich National

Gunther Deschner, Reinhardt Heydrich: A Biography (New
York: Stein and Day, 1981) p. 273.
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Labor Service methodically removed all traces of the village
from the countryside.®^
The question remains regarding the Nazi's choice of
Lidice as a target for revenge.

Why Lidice?

It was a small

mining village with a population no greater than 300,
including children.

A population of this size posed no

serious threat whatever to the German occupation even in the
case of armed revolt.

Furthermore, the Germans never proved

the existence of resistance activity in Lidice.®®

After the

destruction of the town, German investigators learned that
SOE parachutists had been given addresses in Lidice, but
they could make no such connection before June 10.

Hitler

needed a target for retribution, but the circumstances
surrounding the destruction of Lidice were contrived at
best; at worst, they were outright fabrications on the part

" Ibid, p. 274.
There are diverse and conflicting accounts in which the
Germans claim to have found arms caches in Lidice, but these
were discounted as false following the war. German troops
located a radio transmitter in Kladno, but this happened
after the fact and was never connected to Lidice. The
closest alleged connection between Lidice and the Czech
resistance movement were the Horack and Stribrny families,
both of Lidice, whose sons had gone abroad in 1939 and had
not been heard from since. The German investigators assumed
that they were involved in the resistance but were, again,
unable to prove anything of the sort.
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of the German command.
Though the reasons for selecting Lidice may not be
perfectly clear, the policy of the SS toward Czechs during
the summer of 1942 may provide some insights.

As Fuchik

implied in his observations, those Czechs arrested who had
no connection to ongoing investigations were probable
candidates for execution. The German command remained
absolutely intent on the capture of all resistance and SOE
operatives in Czechoslovakia, and were therefore quite
unwilling to immediately execute prisoners that might help
the investigation, though their crimes against the
Protectorate might be more serious than others.

A problem

arose, then, regarding the means of satisfying Hitler's
demand for blood vengeance.

The solution, of course, was to

answer Hitler's call for Czech blood with petty offenders.
It stands to reason then, that this policy of detaining
worthwhile suspects for investigative purposes while
offering the lives of unimportant suspects to satisfy the
emotional need for revenge could have translated to the
selection of Lidice.

The town had no strategic, political,

or tactical importance, thus bypassing the potential loss of
critical war material.

Lidice was physically close to
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Prague, thus ensuring that its destruction would be wellnoted.

Also, Lidice had a relatively small population

concentrated in a small space, thus making the task of
complete destruction easier than destroying the urban areas
of Prague into which the assassins fled immediately
following the attack.

It served the dual needs of the

German command perfectly--quick retribution with minimal
loss to the investigation process.
While it fit the profile of the Nazi's needs, the
inherent problem with the selection of Lidice is obvious.
It is of diminutive stature.

The destruction of a village

of 200 plus inhabitants might go unnoticed in a struggle
with the gigantic magnitude of World War II.

It makes sense

that a war-waging government exacting revenge for the death
of a major statesman would certainly want the revenge to
occur on a grand scale to display, internally and
externally, both the determination of that government to
maintain power and the peril faced by all who stood in its
way.

A radio bulletin announcing the destruction of a small

mining village might, at best, excite a reaction along the
lines of "big deal" from European urban centers, the grim
populations of which wrestled daily with destruction that
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overshadowed the horror of the events at Lidice.

To ensure

that the message got across to all enemies, the Nazis
documented their efforts at Lidice in excruciating detail.
They photographed and filmed the process of destruction.
June 11, the German Government made an official radio
declaration:
In the course of the search for the Murderers
of SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Heydrich irrefutable
indications have been secured that the
population of the village of Lidice u Kladna
afforded support and assistance to
the...criminals....
As the inhabitants of this
village...have offended in the most crude
fashion against the published laws the male
adults have been shot, the women taken to
concentration camps and the children sent
away, so that they may be given the
appropriate education. The buildings in the
village have been razed to the ground and its
name erased."

Not an unfortunate atrocity to be swept under the carpet.

Benes, Report No. XX.

On
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the "Murder of Lidice"^°° was proclaimed loudly to the world.
The reasoning behind the selection of Lidice should be
clear by now, but what, exactly did the Nazis achieve by
making an example of the small community?

Some of the

immediate German reactions to the event provide an
indication as to the effectiveness of the Nazis response to
the shock of Heydrich's assassination.

Vojtech Mastny, a

Czech national who served on the faculties of many U.S.
universities, describes the enthusiasm with which Germans
greeted news of the destruction of Lidice:

100
Murder of Lidice" is the title of a 1942 poem by
Edna St. Vincent Millay.
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The Protectorate chief of the German Reich
Labor Service, in which party members were
required to serve limited terms as workers,
commented on the "moral lesson" which the
leveling of Lidice gave to his men: "The man
who has been assigned to this spot
intensifies his feelings, thus contributing
to the strengthening of German power. The
full effect will be achieved when his work
obliterates all traces of the village and on
the very spot where the enemy of Germandom
used to live the earth is turned under the
plow.
Furthermore, Mastny writes, "The Security Service reported
that the German population of Bohemia and Moravia welcomed
the atrocity with 'great satisfaction and in many cases open
joy...; they even say that officials in high places will now
perceive how the Czechs should be treated. '

This

reaction indicates that the blood revenge demanded by Hitler
had successfully achieved the goals of retribution through
revenge.

The rationale follows a logical progression--the

Nazis needed a quick and easy vent for revenge, and Lidice
fit the requisite profile perfectly.
Lest we get swept up in the cold dispassionate tide of
rationale, it is important to look at the peculiarities of

Mastny, p. 217.
Ibid.
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Lidice's demise and understand it as an anomaly, albeit a
small one, within the destructive framework of World War II.
Very few populations in Europe experienced the per capita
destruction suffered by the residents of Lidice.

Close to

two thirds of the population was either murdered on the spot
or died in concentration camps.

Beyond that, most of the

children of Lidice never returned from their fosterage in
German families. Furthermore, after the war, only a few dim
outlines of building foundations remained on the Czech
countryside that would suggest that the village of Lidice
had ever existed.

The remnants of Lidice consisted mainly

of a handful of survivors and their memories of the place.
Though other urban centers throughout Europe suffered much
more destruction in direct comparison with Lidice, poundfor-pound few suffered destruction with the totality that
the survivors of Lidice faced.

While logically and

thoroughly planned and carried-out, the destruction of
Lidice clearly stands as a tragic atrocity and an
unparalleled act of revenge .

There were a number of towns destroyed in the same manner
as Lidice during the war, but none were a direct, vengeful
response to acts of defiance against the Nazis on the same
magnitude as Heydrich's assassination.
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The relationship between Germany and Czechoslovakia
between 1918 and 1942, and indeed to the end of the war when
the Czech government deported much of the German population
in Czechoslovakia to Germany,"^ indicates, in part, a wellestablished pattern of pathological revenge.

The

destruction of Lidice was a singular and remarkable instance
in a cycle of retribution that began with the creation of
the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918.

Due largely to the

insensitivity of the Versailles peacemakers to the ethnic
particularities of the region, tension developed immediately
that, while subtle at first, would eventually erupt into
violence and outright savagery.

If the memory of Lidice can

serve the peacemaking process at all today, especially in
light of the tragedies of the last few years in the Balkans
and Central Asia, it must serve to show the importance of
ethnicity and emotions in the behavior of the populations of
nation states.

Failure to take the importance of emotions

into account, contemporary efforts at peacemaking will never
adequately compensate for the inevitability of partisanship

See Radomir Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans.

and revenge.

chapter IV
Textual Analysis—Documents

To explain the willingness with which human beings
undertake a vengeful endeavor along the lines of Lidice, it
is necessary to examine the fundamental values of human
society and illuminate the sources which legitimize and
determine the magnitude of revenge.

To the intellectual

historian, the writing and orations of Adolf Hitler can
provide a glimpse the vengeful pulse within Nazi society.
As Chapter 5 will reveal, the nature of a totalitarian
regime mandates a study of the values communicated by the
elite to the populace.

In order for a totalitarian

political system to succeed, as the Nazis did for some time,
the population must largely accept the values and will of
the elite.

These values and will of the totalitarian ruler

serve, therefore, to direct the behavior of a united
national population.

For the purposes of this study, then,

the language of Adolf Hitler provides many useful insights
to the general values of permissiveness toward revenge
projected by the Nazis into German social values and
behavior.
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Hitler's magnum opus, Mein Kampf. is itself a study in
reciprocity and revenge: Obsessed with regaining Germany's
anima, disgraced and downtrodden in the Treaty of
Versailles, Hitler identifies the necessity to reclaim past
greatness and outlines a definitive path to the completion
of his aims.

In the years following the Nazi's rise to

power, Germany would, by and large, follow the mandate
detailed by Hitler.

Though he does not specify widespread

revenge in particular as a course for reclaiming German
greatness. Hitler does use language in his book that
provides potentially permissive attitudes toward the idea of
revenge as it was enacted at Lidice.
In Mein Kampf. Hitler focuses on the humiliation of the
German nation at the hands of the Western allies following
World War I.

This humiliation, mandated by the Treaty of

Versailles, resulted, according to Hitler, from betrayal
within German society rather than from military defeat.

He

emphasizes (correctly) that the German army held its
positions in foreign territory at the end of the war.

To

Hitler, this indicated some measure of military victory.
The German capitulation cannot, then, be clearly justified
in the light of military defeat.

In order to explain the
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acceptance of the allies' terms at Versailles, Hitler
fabricates and details what he called a Marxist-Jewish
revolution that undermined the weak political system and
shattered the very foundations of German society during the
war, thus providing the "stab in the back" that compromised
the heroic military "victory" achieved by the German army.^°^
In Mein Kampf. Versailles and the subsequent humiliation of
Germany provide the prime rallying point for potential
German revenge.
Throughout his writings and speeches. Hitler uses
language that, when analyzed using the methods outlined in
Chapter II, illuminates the shame/rage cycle developed by
Lewis, Retzinger and Scheff.

Hitler evokes shame values by

using such words as, "cowardice,"^"® "decay,

"weakness,"^"®

. .the assertion that the lost War was the cause of the
German collapse [was] a lie. ...this military collapse was
itself ...the consequence of a large number of symptoms of
disease.... This was first the consequence...of an ethical
and moral poisoning...which for many years had begun to
undermine the foundations of the people and the Reich."
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf. trans, by Ralph Manheim (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1943), p. 231. "...these
parliamentary rabble [under the direct influence of a
Marxist-Jewish movement] stole and struck from the hand of a
nation its weapon of self-preservation [the army]...." ibid,
p. 272.
Ibid, p. 230.
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to describe the nature and effects of the Marxist-Jewish
"revolution" that caused the collapse of Germany.

This

discourse evokes feelings of alienation, which in turn
produce the emotion of shame.

As mentioned in Chapter 2,

the emotionally painful nature of a shameful experience may
lead to neurosis and aggressive/destructive behavior.
In Mein Kampf, Hitler illuminates clear targets against
which the German nation should direct its aggression.
Foremost among these are Jews and Marxists, as they are the
forces which Hitler alleges to have directly caused the
shaming of Germany.

While the majority of the text is

devoted to exposing this imagined conspiracy and detailing
the manner in which it has attempted to destroy German
society. Hitler does venture beyond his constructed fantasy
to target more tangible targets as well.
these is the Treaty of Versailles.

Principal among

While Hitler's

destructive "revolution" of 1918 is largely imaginary, he
uses the Treaty and all its disastrous effects on Germany as
evidence of the result of the subversive activities of

Ibid, p. 246.
Ibid, p. 272.
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Marxists and Jews.

In this light, the mandates of the

Treaty represent a clear threat to Germandom, and thus
provide clear targets for vengeful (pathological) rage among
Germans.
While Hitler's evocative language regarding the tragic
erosion of German values, a process that led to the defeat
(shaming)^"® of the German nation, reveals general emotions
related to vengeful and aggressive values, the tie between
the Treaty of Versailles and the creation of the
Czechoslovak Republic narrows the scope of vengeful emotions
to focus on the subject of this study.

As historian Raoul

de Roussey de Sales comments in My World Order;
Hitler promised his people to deliver them
from the shackles of the Versailles Treaty
and to do so against any opposition. The
Versailles Treaty was not only unjust to the
Germans and intolerable, it was also a threat
to the peace of Europe. Until the wrongs of
that treaty were righted, there could be no
peace for any nation.
By making the connection between Czechoslovakia and the
Treaty, Hitler describes Czechoslovakia as a tool of the

See Chapter II.
Adolf Hitler, My New Order, edited with commentary by
Raoul de Roussy de Sales, (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock,
1941) , 452 .
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"Western democracies" used to harm Germans and German
interests.

Throughout the entire section of his April 28,

1939 speech to the Reichstag that deals with Czechoslovakia,
Hitler describes the Western Allies' intent to use
Czechoslovakia as a platform from which to launch an assault
on Germany.

Hitler's intentions in connecting

Czechoslovakia and the Allies is evident in the following
passage from that speech:
The democratic peacemakers of Versailles can
take the credit for having assigned to this
Czech people the special role of satellite
state, capable of being used against Germany.
...they did violence to other nationalities
in order to give a firm basis to a state
which was to incorporate a latent threat to
the German Nation in Central Europe.
For this state, in which the so-called
predominant national element was actually a
minority, could be maintained only by means
of brutal assault.. . .
Hitler's language illuminates shameful emotions.
Germany is threatened with violence, and brutal assault.
The source of these threats?

The Czech people.

Hitler thus

evokes shame through alienation and threat, and further
identifies the cause of the shame, thereby identifying a

Adolf Hitler, Official Translation of the Speech
Delivered by Adolf Hitler before the German Reichstag on
April 28. 1939 (Washington: German Embassy, 1939), 14.
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target for vindictive aggression.
Also clear in this passage is Hitler's intent to
intimately connect the mistreatment of Germans in
Czechoslovakia to the Germans in Germany under the broad
construct of ethnic nationhood.

The Allies and the Czechs

did not assault and harm states and countries, they harmed
people, specifically "other nationalities" and the "German
Nation."

An emotional response might be less acutely felt

if it is a reaction to an abstract construction such as a
state or a border or a country.

When, however, the object

of aggression is given some sort of direct connection to
humanity such as "nationalities" or ethnic "nations," the
connection between the victim and the perceiver is cast in
human terms, and is therefore more intimate.

By describing

a pattern of abuse directed against Germans as people,
rather than Germany as a state, and further connecting these
abuses to the shame of Versailles, Hitler enables his
audience to experience an emotional response which justifies
vengeful action.

While Hitler's speech to the Reichstag was

primarily aimed at addressing Western opposition to the
German occupation of Czechoslovakia, he also used language
that could have permitted German citizens and soldiers to
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develop values that enabled them to accept and participate
in acts of revenge against Czechs.
Another source

which reveals projected permission for

revenge is Hitler's speech to the Reichstag, of April 28,
1939.^^^

Here again, Hitler's language provides some

insights to the manner in which Hitler regarded the Czechs
specif ically.

Throughout the section in which Hitler

addresses Germany and Czechoslovakia, he defends the German
occupation as beneficial for all of Central Europe.

Hitler

begins by making a tie between ethnic Germans and the
territories of Bohemia and Moravia.

Following the

"inexplicable" migration of Germans from these lands, "...a
foreign Slav people made its way into this territory and
made a place for itself between the remaining Germans."^"
This statement casts the Czechs in the role of unwanted
guests, if not actual invaders.
Hitler furthermore claims that the destinies of the

One month following the German occupation of
Czechoslovakia.
Hitler, Official Translation of the Speech Delivered by
Adolf Hitler before the German Reichstag on April 28. 1939.
Ibid, p. 13.
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Czech people and the Germans are interlocked and that the
Czechs are dependent on Germany for their continued
existence due to the strong ties between the two nations.
This dependence, according to Hitler, is evident at many
different levels.
indivisible.

The countries are economically

Hitler claims that the Czechs can not exist as

an independent economic entity "..except on the basis of a
relationship with the German Nation and the German
e c o n o m y . H i t l e r goes on to declare that the "Czech
economy owes its existence to the fact of having been part
of the great German economic system.

In addition to

economic ties. Hitler describes Czech culture as being
primarily dependent upon German culture.

His claim is

evident in the following:
The Czech nation is in its origin foreign to
us, but in the thousand years in which the
two peoples have lived side by side, Czech
culture has in the main been formed and
moulded by German influences.... The capital
of this country was for a time a German
imperial city, and it contains the oldest
German university. Numerous cathedrals, town
halls, and palaces of nobility and citizen
class bear witness to the influence of German
Ibid.
Ibid, pp. 13-14.
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culture .
In this language, Hitler describes the economic and
cultural dependence of Czechoslovakia on Germany and in
doing so creates a parasitic relationship between Czech
society and German society that places the Czechs in the
role of wards of the German state and German culture/^®
This idea of wardenship would endure to the end of the war.
On February 21, 1945, one of Hitler's assistants,
Martin Bormann, recorded the following as part of Hitler's
political testament:
...we could not tolerate in the heart of
Germany an abscess, small though it was, like
an independent Czech state. We lanced the
abscess in March, 1939, but in circumstances
that were psychologically less favorable than
those which would have obtained [sic] had we
settled the issue by force in 1938. For in
March, 1939, for the first time, we put
ourselves in the wrong eyes of world opinion.
No longer were we restricting ourselves to
reuniting Germans to the Reich, but we were
establishing a protectorate over a non-German

Ibid, pp. 13, 14.
Here, another aspect of the shame/rage theories developed
by Lewis, Retzinger, and Scheff is evident. In other cases
examined in this work. Hitler's language carries connotative
meanings that evoke shame as a result of alienation through
distancing or separation. Here, the language evokes shame
through envelopment or uncomfortable proximity.
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population.
As the wardens of Czechoslovakia, then, Germans are
responsible for its continued well-being as a part of the
German nation.

With any superior-subordinate relationship,

there must exist at least an implied set of limits to
regulate behavior. Whether it is the relationship between
military leaders and their troops, teachers and students, or
parents and children, there are accepted norms which address
unacceptable behavior and reprisal or punishment. If a
soldier stands guilty of insubordination, he may be reduced
in rank.

A student who distracts other students from their

work may be sent to detention.

A child who disobeys her

parents may be subject to "time out" or a spanking.
Similarly, when the Czechs reacted with defiance to the
German occupation, they were, in the German perception, in

Francois Genoud, ed.. The Testament of Adolf Hitler: The
Hitler-Bormann Documents. February-April, 1945. trans by
R.H. Stevens, (London: Cassell, 1959) p. 84.
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need of corrective guidance.

This guidance is not wholly

punitive and negative in nature.

When we discipline our own

children, it is not to shame and harm them, but to correct
their transgressions and help them to learn acceptable
behavior.

If German soldiers at Lidice possessed

(consciously or subconsciously) this idea of wardenship of
Czechs, it would enable them to carry out the atrocities at
Lidice with the knowledge that their actions were not
exclusively aimed at harming people, but by doing so they
were helping the Czech nation to realize acceptable behavior
that would promote harmony between Czechs and Germans.
Hitler raises another issue in this speech, one to
which he would return whenever confronted with the Czech
question.

He details the brutal Czech mistreatment of the

Germans, and in such light describes the German occupation
of Czechoslovakia as an effort to protect Germans living
within the Czech borders.

As Hitler describes his motives:

"Germany was primarily interested in one thing only and that
was to liberate the nearly four million Germans in this
country from their unbearable situation. . . .

Hitler, Speech Before the Reichstag, April
28, 1939, p. 15.
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Hitler first puts this mistreatment in historical context.
He states that,
...nearly four million Germans lived in this
territory of Bohemia and Moravia [after the
majority of the German nation had migrated
westward]. A policy of national annihilation
which set in, particularly after the Treaty
of Versailles, under pressure of the Czech
majority combined, too, with economic
conditions and the rising tide of distress,
led to the emigration of these German
elements, so that the Germans left in the
territory were reduced to approximately 3.7
million."'
In this excerpt. Hitler mentions two issues aimed at
evoking an emotional response from his audience.

First, he

speaks in general of a program of "national annihilation"
directed against Germans.

By doing so, he has overtly laid

the foundation for the justification of his occupation of
Czechoslovakia.

More important to this study, though, is

the implicit meaning and effects of Hitler's language.

The

idea of national annihilation directed against Germans can
excite in all Germans who read or hear this speech a
vindictive reaction.

Ibid, p. 13. Annihilation and distress resulting from
the Treaty of Versailles indicates the presence of
alienation, shame, and a target for aggression.
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We do not need to examine the work of a sociologist
such as Scheff to understand a society-wide vengeful impulse
in this context.

When people see or hear about members of

their group, whether it be a family, a team, an army, or a
nation, being harmed, they naturally experience an emotional
reaction that generates a desire to see the perpetrator(s)
brought to justice.

Americans need only look back to their

reaction to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.
The United States followed the shame/rage cycle in textbook
fashion through the language of President Roosevelt and the
almost instantaneous declaration of war.

In more recent

memory, Americans can look to the Oklahoma City bombing of
April, 1995, or the disaster that befell a platoon of US
Army Rangers in Somalia in 1994, to recall painful feelings
of loss (exposure, vulnerability, shame) and their
emotionally vindictive reactions to these events.

When we

saw video footage of the Ranger being dragged through the
crowded streets, we, as a national group, wanted to see the
guilty parties punished.
Language that evokes shame (in accordance with the
theories of Lewis, Retzinger, and Scheff), while key in
understanding the manner in which nonpathological people are
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"permitted" to engage in pathological behavior, is not the
only indicator of the values projected upon the German
population by Hitler.

In addition to evoking shameful

emotions and establishing targets for vindictive aggression,
Hitler provides justification for aggressive behavior
through the language with which he examines the submission
of one state to another prefaces his attitude toward
territories conquered by the Nazis and the peoples who
inhabited these lands:
That the stain of cowardly submission can
never be effaced; that the drop of poison in
the blood of a people is passed on to
posterity and will paralyze and undermine the
strength of later generations...; even the
loss of this freedom after a bloody and
honorable struggle assures the rebirth of a
people and its seed of life from which some
day a new tree will strike fast roots.
Though he is referring directly to the German nation, the
values held by Hitler regarding Czechoslovakia can be
extracted from the text.

The message here is twofold.

First, Hitler condemns any society that willingly passes its
sovereign torch to another power without a struggle.

Such a

society, such a race that submits willingly, has forever

Hitler, Mein Kampf. p. 669.
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compromised its fundamental honor and integrity, and has
lost any rightful potential to continue as a society.

This

view lends a permissive attitude toward German aggression in
an attempt to assuage the effects of shameful emotions
{"cowardly submission [will] paralyze and undermine the
strength of later generations").

Hitler's language also

serves to justify the harsh treatment of Czechs due to their
willing capitulation to Germany in 1939.

As they gave up

without a nationalized resistance, as a people, the Czechs
lost their vitality as potentially progressive human beings.
To strip the argument to its bones-- since the Czechs
submitted willingly, their destruction is imminent and
necessary lest their 'poisoned blood' come to infect the
rightful German conquerors.

To kill Czechs is not,

according to Hitler's values, an abomination, it is simply
speeding them toward their inevitable destiny.

Hitler

details this idea further:
For this is the 'drop of poison' of which
Clausewitz speaks: the spinelessness which
once begun must increase more and more and
which gradually becomes the foulest heritage,
burdening every future decision. It can only
become a terrible lead weight, a weight which
a nation is not likely to shake off, but
which finally drags it down into the
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existence of a slave race.
In this passage, Hitler notes the qualifier that he
mentioned beforehand.

He states that the "poisoned" society

is "not likely" to shake off the weight of past cowardice.
This qualified statement suggests that if a society does
resist, it can counter the otherwise terminal effects of
cowardice.

This second part of Hitler's statement exposes

another facet of his permissive attitude toward revenge.
Hitler suggests that a nation that resists the encroachment
of another, though the first may be overcome and occupied,
maintains confident assurance that they will eventually rise
again to regain their past stature.

With reference to the

assassination of Heydrich, this idea takes on tremendous
importance.

If a country resists occupation, it plants the

"seed of life from which some day a new tree will strike
fast roots.
In order to ensure ongoing Nazi primacy in the
conquered territories, any hints of resistance must be dealt

Ibid, p. 670. Again, Hitler's language evokes shame:
spinelessness will drag the nation down to the existence of
a slave race.
Ibid.
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with swiftly and severely.

Hitler's awareness of the rise

of the Nazi party, both in speculative preview in Mein Kampf
in 1925 and in reflection in 1942, made him sensitive to the
potential of uprisings.

"Passive resistance will never

drive off occupying armies.

This language projects

permissive values with regards to revenge in two ways: It
evokes shame within German society for their past passivity
in accepting defeat following World War I and also demands a
savage response to Heydrich's assassination.

This second,

connotative meaning is evident if the voice of the phrase is
inverted from passive to active: Active resistance will
drive off occupying armies.

Here, Hitler combines shades of

past shame with the necessity to crush any active opposition
to Germany's reemergence.

As such. Hitler's language

mandates active retaliation against threats to Germany's
necessary ascension and expansion--a style of retaliation
manifested by the Germans at Lidice.

Though Hitler intended

these passages as a call to arms for the German nation in
response to the Treaty of Versailles, they shed light on his
attitude toward nations that capitulate willingly, as did

Ibid, p. 684
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Czechoslovakia.

His language of predation suggests that

such countries deserve such harsh treatment as they receive,
and any resistance to occupation must be met with savage
retribution.
In a conversation recorded by Martin Bormann on May 20,
1942,^^® Hitler, using language by now familiar, stated that,
...never in the course of history have
the Czechs shown themselves capable of
solving their own political problems, and
even in their cultural development leant
heavily on the German culture of the Hapsburg
state. The right, and indeed, for the German
Reich the obvious policy is firstly to purge
the country of all dangerous elements, and
then to treat the Czechs with friendly
consideration. ...a certain feeling of
guilt, coupled with the fear of being
compelled to evacuate their homes, as the
result of the transfer of population we are
undertaking, will persuade them that it will
be in their interests to emerge as zealous
co-operators of the Reich. It is this fear
which besets them that explains why the
Czechs at the moment--and particularly in the
war factories--are working to our complete
satisfaction, doing their most under the
slogan: "Everything for our Fuhrer, Adolf
Hitler!

One week before the attack on Heydrich.
H. R. Trevor-Roper, Hitler's Secret Conversations. 19411944• trans, by Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens, (New York:
Farrar, Straus, and Young, 1953), p. 400.
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In this passage Hitler emphasizes the same ties he had
drawn between the Czech State and Germany in April of 1939.
He makes it clear that the Czechs are dependent on German
guidance to survive.

In addition, he makes two points that

augment permissive values evoked by his language as it
pertains to the Czechs.

First, Hitler declares that the

Germans must eradicate all "dangerous elements" within Czech
society in order that the Czechs and the Germans can get on
with a harmonious relationship.

One can only assume that

Hitler is referring to the Czech resistance efforts that had
been active^^® since the German occupation in 1939.

By

labeling the resistance as dangerous elements. Hitler
highlights the threat that they pose to German national
interest.

As such, he is advocating their elimination by

any means necessary--he is not specific.

If the resistance

is relayed to German citizens and soldiers as being a threat
to Germany's national interest, especially if intimate
language is used, the permission for Germans to harm any
Czechs associated with the resistance is clear.

It is important to note that the Czech resistance was
actively encouraged and backed by the British.
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In addition to his reinforcement of the close ties
between the Germans and Czechoslovakia, Hitler uses another
style of language that lends itself to the harsh treatment
of Czechs--dehumanization.

He describes the treatment of

Czechs whereby they are coerced through guilt^^® and fear to
relocate and further provide a symbiotic labor force that
produces war material for the Reich--the political, social,
and cultural overseer upon which the Czechs are totally
dependent for sustenance and protection.

This is the slave

race to which Hitler referred in Mein Kampf (see above).
Another example of the attempt by Hitler to dehumanize
the Czechs (or certainly to delegitimize their state) is
found in a speech delivered at Nuremburg on September 12,
1938 Hitler described the creation of the Czechoslovak state
as "a short sighted piece of work..." and explained that
...the statesmen at Versailles brought the
abnormal structure of Czechoslovakia into
being. It was possible to violate the
demands of millions of another nationality
[Sudeten Germans] only so long as the brother
nation itself [Germany] was suffering from
the consequences of general maltreatment by

We can assume that Hitler means the guilt that Czechs
feel for their past programs of "national annihilation"
conducted against the Germans.
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the world.""
Hitler's language is clear.

The Czech state is an aberrant,

"abnormal" creation of the Western allies.

Czechoslovakia

is not a traditional entity among the ethnic nations of
Central Europe, and as such not only does it not belong, but
it has directly "violated" the lives of ethnic Germans and
is party to the general "suffering" endured across Europe by
the German nation.

Hitler's language implies that

Czechoslovakia does not belong as a Central European state,
and further implies that once that state is gone, German
suffering will be reduced.

By referring to the Czech state

as "abnormal," Hitler is excluding it from legitimate ethnic
citizenship in Central Europe.

Hitler's language therefore

permits revenge on two counts.

First, he excludes the

Czechs as a legitimate people of Central Europe (a form of
dehumanization) and second, connects them directly to the
suffering of the Sudeten Germans and indirectly to the
hardships faced by Germans in general.

Hitler, My World Order, p. 508.
Through the creation of Czechoslovakia, The Treaty of
Versailles produced suffering within, and the general
maltreatment of Germany--alienation, shame, and a target for
vindictive aggression.
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Any time a society at war can reduce its enemy to
subhuman or a generally exclusive status, it eases the
difficult task of actually killing that enemy.

As

experienced by American infantrymen around the world, this
phenomenon is universally constant.

Japanese soldiers in

the Pacific campaign during WWII were "Japs."

In

caricatures on propaganda posters the images of Japanese
soldiers bore no resemblance to real human beings, rather,
they were rat-faced, yellow, leering, bespeckled figures
that displayed a more demonic than human quality.

To US

soldiers in the Vietnam War and also to the American public,
the Viet Cong were sneaky, silent, deadly "gooks" in black
pajamas who exhibited almost superhuman qualities of stealth
and murderous potential.

The rest of the Vietnamese were

often referred to as hapless "slopes."

During the Persian

Gulf War and various other US military deployments to the
Middle East, the people in the engagement areas were
referred to either as "Ragheads", "Bob" (short for "Bedouin
Bob"), or "Sand Niggers" (Iraqis.)

In all of the examples

listed, people were trying to psychologically ease for

The Japanese were also characterized as "monkeys" during
the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).
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themselves the enormous burden of killing other people.
When Hitler painted a portrait of the Czech people as a
subservient race whose sole purpose it was to provide the
manpower that drove the German war industry, he made the
task of killing Czechs, whether they were resistance
fighters or civilians, easier for those soldiers ordered to
perform the killing.
The previous textual excerpts have displayed several
examples of the means through which the language of Adolf
Hitler may have provided the citizens and soldiers of
Germany the historical context and permission needed to
carry out such atrocious acts as that committed at Lidice.
Simple, general permission does not, however, provide German
society with a psychological carte blanche that enables them
to participate in all sorts of vengeful activities.
question of limits must be acceptably addressed.

The

It is one

thing to achieve retribution for a capital crime by hunting
down and executing the perpetrator, and another issue
entirely to massacre innocents to atone for a single death.
As discussed above, part of the motivation for the degree
to which the Germans enacted revenge at Lidice was
political.

Soldiers and even civilians in a warring
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society, however, are not uniformly moved to pathological
brutality merely by descriptive political motivations based
upon autobiographies or speeches written or delivered years
before.

There must, therefore, be some permission granted

to these people regarding brutality as seen in the specific
and immediate case of Lidice.
Another example of this permission is found in a
conversation of Hitler recorded on May 22, 1942:
In the same way I am of the opinion that one
should proceed with the utmost severity
against other contemptible crimes which have
sprung up under war conditions--for instance,
theft under cover of a black-out. For,
except by truly barbaric methods, how can one
suppress such crimes...as bag-snatching,
assaults on women, housebreaking when the
cellar door is left open and so on? For all
such crimes there must be one penalty alone-the death penalty, whether the evil-doer is
seventy or seventeen years of age.
With this "zero-tolerance" language. Hitler legitimizes the
control of petty crimes by "barbaric" means.

If the penalty

for these relatively minor infractions is death, the
destruction of a village as punishment for the assassination
of a national official might make sense on an escalatory
scale.

By promoting "barbaric" executions as punishment for

Adolf Hitler, as cited in Trevor-Roper, p. 408.
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theft and burglary. Hitler is lending implicit permission
for such acts as perpetrated at Lidice.

Indeed, throughout

such works as Mein Kampf and the documents of Hitler's
speeches and conversations, there exists an abundance of
language that calls for severely punitive measures to deal
with the enemies of the German nation.

Hitler's "Final

Solution" will ever bear testament to the brutality
envisioned by the leadership of the Third Reich and the
permission and legitimation of acts of brutality realized
and actuated by Germans under Nazi rulership.

Summary
This section has developed an analysis of several
documents in which the language of Adolf Hitler provided
implicit permission for Germans to participate in acts of
revenge.

To reiterate, the focus of this work describes the

need among nonpathological people for some sort of
permission to participate in organized and deliberate
atrocities as witnessed in the case of Lidice.

Without some

sort of implicit permission to instill the values necessary
to slaughter civilians in an act of state revenge, human
beings, regardless of the immediate context, be it war or
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peace, would be unable to make a reasonably confident
individual decision to participate.
This analysis relies heavily on the theoretical work of
Lewis, Retzinger and Scheff regarding shame and vindictive
aggression.

It is evident, however, that shame alone did

not enable Hitler to project pathological values upon German
society.

Analysis of the discourse of the preceding

excerpts reveals the many levels at which language both
revealed and evoked the values and behavior of German
society under the Nazis.
Hitler's language provides this permission on several
levels.

In Mein Kampf. Hitler casts his vision of the

destiny and the direction of the German nation in general
terms.

He speaks of the tragedy of willing capitulation and

the dangers of insurrection.

In other documents. Hitler is

more specific in addressing the issues facing Germany and
Czechoslovakia.

He ties the German people to the lands of

Bohemia and Moravia, and vilifies the Western allies and the
Treaty of Versailles for manufacturing a political Czech
state which serves to oppress Germans within its borders and
further threatens the national security of Germany and the
stability of Europe.

Finally, Hitler reduces the Czech
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state to an unacceptably abnormal entity and its citizens to
a subhuman (sub-German) status.

Through his language,

Hitler sets the larger stage for the harsh treatment of
enemies of Germany, then subsequently identifies the Czechs
as enemies and casts them in the role of an inferior race, a
race that only exists to serve the German nation.

All of

these perceptions of Czechoslovakia and its inhabitants
create an atmosphere within which an act of revenge, even if
it seems excessive, remains permissible within the values of
German society.
Further examples of Hitler's permissive language can be
found elsewhere.

One can look at any portion of Mein Kampf

or any segment of Hitler's speeches and conversations and
find them replete with the same sorts of permissive language
indicated above.

While it was not likely Hitler's will to

specifically target the Czechs and set them up for vengeful
atrocities, and likewise was certainly not the collective
will of the German people to do so, the extent to which Nazi
propaganda confronted German society ensured that Germans in
general and soldiers specifically came into contact with the
ideas and language outlined above.
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This chapter has also detailed the second assertion of
this work--that this permissive, emotional language of
revenge is a universal, species-wide phenomenon.

Several

instances where American society experienced certain aspects
of emotional reactions and permissive language serve to show
that the pattern of pathological behavior was not limited to
Nazi Germany or other totalitarian systems.

The Germans

were not peculiar in their permissive values related to
revenge.

Even a superficial examination of the records of

human history reveals widespread instances of state revenge.
Through comparison of the German experience as defined by
language and values to certain recent American experiences,
we can identify the potential universality of the issue.

chapter V.
Political Analysis--Conscious and Unconscious Permission

The language of Adolf Hitler displays clearly the
values which, as this study claims, provided the necessary
permission for Germans to both participate in and react
favorably to acts of pathological revenge as seen at Lidice.
To claim, however, that the Germans at Lidice and in the
Sudetenlands acted strictly in response to Hitler's will
and/or Nazi coercion presents a gross oversimplification.
The participants at Lidice were not simply automatons.
as mentioned in Chapter 1, were they homicidal maniacs.

Nor,
In

order to understand the nature of permissive values conveyed
to the Germans involved in the tragedy at Lidice it is
useful to consult works of political theory in order to form
a more complete understanding of the mutually-affective
relationship between Hitler and the German Nation.
With few, if any, exceptions, the political nature of
the Third Reich and its leader have provided a subject for
more political analyses than any other comparable
phenomenon.

Since the 1930's, political scientists have

speculated about the meaning of the Nazis' rise to power and

114

115

wrestled with analyses of the consequences.

Perhaps no

political system, and certainly no individual have had a
more profound effect on our lives today as the Third Reich
and Adolf Hitler.

These analyses all seek to shed some

light on one of the more troubling issues of Nazi Germany-the enthusiasm with which the German population embraced the
ideas of Hitler and the Nazis, and the profound consequences
that followed.
Historians tend to be accurate, though somewhat
limited, in their analysis of the positive reaction of the
Germans to the Nazis.

Cast in the context of the crushing

financial burden of the Versailles Diktat. the impotence of
the Weimar government, and the devastation of the depression
of 1929, it is easy to imagine the total desperation of the
Germans.

A desperation which allowed Hitler to deliver an

attractive, messianic party-line to the German nation.

In a

sweeping description of the values shared by Nazis and
Germans rising from the historical context of the inter-war
years, Emil Ludwig portrays the attitudes of "average"
Germans in a 1930 New York Times article:
...Versailles did great damage. Even
[opponents to Nazi extremism] felt that we
were defrauded--we, indeed, most of all
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because we believed in a new Europe.
...under the pressure of [war reparations]
German prejudices are being strengthened
rather than weakened, and a foresighted
policy would favor a revision of the
[Versailles] treaty, for it is in this that
German advocates of revenge still find their
strongest arguments .
Ludwig describes the contextual seedbed for the Nazi
success.

While he does not yet recognize or ac>cnowledge (at

Emil Ludwig, "The Average German Speaks," December 7,
1930, from Nazis and Fascists in Europe. 1918-1945. John
Weiss, ed., (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969). reprint from
the New York Times Magazine. December 7, 1930, (New York:
New York Times Co., 1930), pp. 76, 82. My italics. Ludwig
also identifies the connection in values regarding Poland
and Czechoslovakia. As the products of the Versailles
treaty, they were targets of collective envy-turned-loathing
through the vengeful rhetoric of the Nazis, See ibid, p. 78.
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least in print) the nature of the Nazi movement, he does
identify the general climate in which Germans were initially
receptive to Hitler's rhetoric of reclaiming German
greatness.
The Germans of the Weimar era were primed for the
Nazis' language detailing an end to suffering and the
emergence of a German phoenix from the ashes of 1918.
Examining the peculiar nature of the inter-war years, the
reasons for German enthusiasm toward the messages of the
Nazis become clear.

Less clear in the efforts of

historians, however, is the nature of the relationship
between the German people and the Nazis.

While the

historical context of the Weimar era effectively sets the
stage for German acceptance of Hitler, history alone cannot
provide a complete and detailed portrait of the relationship
between Hitler and the Germans--the relationship from which
springs the permission necessary for pathological tragedies
like Lidice.
One very dominant and effective genre of political
analysis regarding the positive relationship between the
Germans and Hitler is found in the study of totalitarianism.
Hannah Arendt, in her 1951 work entitled. The Origins of
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Totalitarianism, describes totalitarian movements as
mass organizations of atomized, isolated
individuals. Compared with other parties and
movements, their most conspicuous external
characteristic is their demand for total,
unrestricted, unconditional, and unalterable
loyalty of the individual member.
Arendt makes a clear case for the study of individual values
and the effect of totalitarianism on the values and
subsequent behavior of individuals within a totalitarian
regime.

Her language highlights the role of the individual

as a participant in, rather than simply a subject of the
totalitarian movement.
As totalitarianism demands the positive participation
of the individuals comprising society, totalitarian elites
must somehow secure this complete loyalty within the
societies they intend to rule.

Arendt details this point

when she writes:
Total loyalty is possible only when fidelity
is emptied of all concrete content, from
which changes of mind might naturally arise.
The totalitarian movements...have done their
utmost to get rid of the party programs which
specified concrete content and which they
inherited from earlier, nontotalitarian

Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1951), p. 316.
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stages of development."®
Here Arendt speaks of some level of mind control.

For

totalitarianism to succeed, the leadership must create a new
format for political loyalty.

This new, revolutionary

loyalty must contain exclusively the values stemming
directly from the totalitarian elite.

Unlike many other

types of regimes, totalitarian leaders must resist the urge
to build upon past values and ideologies which formed the
previous "nontotalitarian" phases of their society.
In this portion of her analysis Arendt runs into a
problem with Hitler and the rise of the Nazis, for Hitler
certainly evoked values, perceptions, desires, and
traditions from pre-Nazi Germany to attain and maintain the
Nazi totalitarian state.

For Hitler to have enjoyed "total

loyalty" as described by Arendt, he would have had to employ
not only rhetoric, but also instituted new cultural norms
free from the influence of all previous German culture,
society, and political systems.

In theory, then,

totalitarianism demands a complete social revolution that
frees society from all previous "nontotalitarian" values.

Ibid, p. 317.
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This, quite simply, did not occur in Germany.
Arendt addresses this conflict between the theoretical
demands and goals of a model totalitarian system and those
manifested in the Fascist movements in Europe:
The true goal of Fascism was only to seize
power and establish the Fascist 'elite' as
uncontested ruler over the country;
totalitarianism's aspiration to total
domination eliminates the distance between
the ruler and the ruled population. ...the
ultimate goal of the dictatorial party, ie.,
the seizure of power and the occupation of
the state machinery, is for the totalitarian
movement only a transitory stage in its total
expansion into the population. . . .
Arendt mentions two crucial themes of totalitarianism as
seen in Europe in the 1930's and 40's: The intimacy of the
relationship between the "ruler and the ruled" (Hitler and
the Germans), and the goal of total domination of the
infrastructure of society.

If we can believe that the only

goal of the Nazis was to establish their "elite" as the sole
motivating force in German society, and that this control
produced an intimate relationship between the elite and the
rest of Germany, then it is easy to develop theories
regarding the ease and efficiency with which Nazi values

Ibid, p. 318.
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came to define and drive German social behavior.
Acceptable behavioral standards in totalitarian
societies can therefore be related to a collective response
to the language of leaders and the context within which that
language is perceived and interpreted.

Two works that

reflect the connection between national decision-makers and
national behavior are Foreign Policy Decision-Making, by
Richard Snyder, H. Bruck, and Burton Spine,

and

Psychological Aspects of International Conflict, by Ross
Stanger."®

Both books aim to describe the behavior of

nation-states as defined and driven by decision-making.
Their primary goal is to connect the actions of modern
states to the behavior of specific individuals.

Stanger,

especially, examines this relationship in a psychological
context.

The authors examine the decision-making process on

many levels (such as institutions, groups, and
organizations) but invariably return to highlight the strong
influence that the decisions of individual leaders have in

Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Spine, Foreign
Policy Decision-Making (New York: The Free Press, 1958).
Ross Stanger, Psychological Aspects of International
Conflict (Belmont: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1967).
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affecting the behavior of the nation-state in which they
serve some authoritative function.

While the authors

examine the potential for a mutually-affective relationship
between individuals, organizations, and society at large, it
is important to acknowledge the degree to which absolute
authority (as wielded by Hitler) increases the affective
potential of an individual leader's decisions upon national
behavior.

In other words, the more absolute the power of

the elite, the more a single individual's decisions, or
rhetoric, can potentially affect the behavior of society.
Harold Lasswell lends additional weight to the
completeness with which Nazi values dominated German
society.

In the introduction to his 1965 compilation. World

Revolutionary Elites, he asserts that totalitarian elites
are completely self-defined.

In accordance to Arendt ' s

analysis of totalitarianism, this assertion agrees with the
idea that leaders such as Hitler had to somehow mold public
opinion with regard to past, nontotalitarian traditions in
German culture.

Hitler's solution to the problem of

Harold Lasswell, and Daniel Lerner, eds. , World
Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological
Movements (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 5.
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pretotalitarian values took the form of intense ideological
manipulation through propaganda and censorship.
In a New York Times article of January, 1939, Junius B.
Wood describes the manner in which the Nazis built a
consensus through censorship and manipulation.

Writing from

Berlin, Wood tells us that "the newspapers are informed
[daily] on government policy.

They receive and follow

instructions on what to print about it.

...they get the

report of the official news agency... whose version must be
used."^^^

Wood further describes the voracity with which the

German population consumes the reports of the governmentcontrolled media.

The combination of media control on the

part of the Nazis and the avaricious nature of the German
readership is one example of the manner in which Hitler
approached the problem of pre-Nazi values and traditions in
German society.
This movement to control the minds of Germany was led
by Hitler's propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels.

In 1937,

Junius B. Wood, "Channeling News for the Nazis," from
Nazis and Fascists in Europe. 1918-1945 John Weiss, ed.,
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969) reprint from the New York
Times Magazine January 15, 1939 (New York: New York Times
Co., 1939), p. 130.
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Albion Ross described the efforts of Goebbels in the New
York Times, writing that "Thought control pervades the
atmosphere.

It stares out of every printed page.

accounts for the music that you hear on the radio.
out in every conversation.
torments the Neurotic.

It
It crops

It is like the fixed idea that

Even while you are resisting, the

propagandists are exercising their influence on you."^^^
Ross describes the detail and enthusiasm with which Goebbels
approached his work as propaganda minister.

While

skepticism and resistance are evident among Germans at the
time of this article, Ross describes the Nazi efforts at
mind control as a constant, determined process.

In

predicting the eventual success of Goebbels's efforts, Ross
quotes him:

"'The nature of propaganda is quite unlimited.

It adapts itself to the person for whom it is intended
The Nazi efforts at mind control did not begin and end
with the media.

German culture, as most cultures, was and

is steeped in tradition.

As it concerns the effectiveness

Albion Ross, "Goebbels Edits the Popular mind in
Germany," Feb 12, 1937, New York Times Magazine as cited in
Ludwig, pp. 137-38. [My italics]
Ibid, p. 143.
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of totalitarianism, these traditions are pretotalitarian and
therefore problematic.

Elizabeth Wiskemann, writing in the

New York Times in 1934, describes the efforts of the Nazis
to come to terms with the cultural problem:
...Herr Hitler and his followers [are
attempting] not only a political and economic
but also a cultural revolution. The
sentimentalism, internationalism and
individualism which had run riot before the
World War [WWI] were to give way to qualities
more suitable to the nature of an
authoritarian and nationalistic state. The
'pure Aryan' was to have his innings in the
arts as well as in business and politics.
While Wiskemann's claims of a total cultural revolution,
especially regarding sentimentalism, do not completely
stand-up to historical scrutiny, she does illuminate
important aspects of the manner in which the Nazis coalesced
their control of German values.

The Nazis, while unable to

affect a total social revolution in Germany, did manage,
through the relentless efforts of their Propaganda Ministry
and the intimacy of the relationship between the elites and
the populace, to augment traditional German social values
with the values of the Nazi elite.

They created a new Aryan

Elizabeth Wiskemann, "On the Cultural Front the Nazis
Drive," May 27, 1934, New York Times Magazine, as cited in
Ludwig, p. 160.
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mythology which, rather than obliterating the past of
Germandom, altered contemporary perceptions of Germandom and
the manner in which Germans viewed the peculiarities of
their collective past.
Evidence of their success is easily found in news
reports of the time.

On March 29, 1936, Otto Tolischus

wrote an account of Hitler's success at consensus-building
in the New York Times:
The German Nation goes to the polls today to
endorse, with practical unanimity
foreordained, Adolf Hitler and all his works
and...to elect a new Reichstag chosen by him
to shout approval whenever such demonstration
is deemed advisable.
Taken at face value...the spectacle of a
great people being at last welded into a
national unity through the struggle for
resurgence...is not without grandeur. ...the
majority is bound to be so overwhelming that
Hitler will still be able to repeat... the
taunting challenge he flung out at foreign
statesmen during the election campaign:
'Behind me stands the whole German
people. Who stands behind you? '
Tolischus goes on to describe this achievement as the
"result of the skillful wielding of the weapons of

Otto D. Tolischus, "Spurring a Nation: The Nazi Way,"
March 29, 1936, New York Times Magazine as cited in Ludwig,
p. 144. [emphasis added]
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propaganda backed by the persuasive power of force.
As evident from the preceding analysis of
totalitarianism, a convincing case can be made tying the
values of German society during World War II to the
manipulations of the Nazi elite.

There is no shortage of

thoughtful, interpretive analyses regarding the phenomenon
of totalitarianism nor of evidence to bolster these
theories.

Within the confines totalitarian values the case

for permissive language regarding revenge is clear.

The

intimate tie between the Nazi elite and the population
enabled the Nazis to plant and then nurture such permissive
values necessary in order to ensure compliance from the
Germans, even to the extent of participation in and/or
approval of a tragedy such as Lidice.
It is important to understand the manner in which the
Nazi leadership acquired and maintained almost complete
control of the perception of the German nation, and in doing
so were able to effect behavior and values concurrent with
that of the Nazi regime.

This approach to understanding the

behavior of the German people in World War II, though

Ibid, p. 145.
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convincing, is problematic with regard to this work.

While

the phenomenon of pathological revenge can make sense both
under the desperate conditions described by historical
analyses and in theories of totalitarianism, these
approaches to the problem fail to illuminate the universal
nature of the phenomenon.

If institutionalized revenge

occurred only in countries undergoing some desperate plight
induced by a foreign nation, or in countries governed by
totalitarian regimes, this analysis of the nature of
totalitarianism would provide sufficient explanation for
revenge in war as pathological behavior.

Examination of the

human experience does not, however, back this claim.

While

it is easy to say that totalitarian regimes in general, and
the experience of Germany in particular, enhance the
probability of tragedies such as Lidice, revenge has, and
continues to occur around the world within many different
political and historical climates.
In order to analyze revenge as a more universal
phenomenon, therefore, it is necessary to examine political
theories that provide a more comprehensive view of human
nature and political behavior.

As a large part of this work

uses psychological and sociological theories to examine
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permissive language, it makes sense to consult psychological
approaches to political theory.

Herbert Kelman provides a

solid foundation upon which to build more detailed ideas
regarding psychology, politics, aggression, and revenge.

In

his essay entitled, "Social-Psychological Approaches to the
Study of International Relations," Kelman writes:
One cannot expect [due to the complexity
of human societies] that the behavior of
a nation will be a direct reflection of
the motives of its citizens or even of
its leaders. ... Leaders may engage in
aggressive behavior for strategic
reasons...and the population at large
for reasons of social conformity.
Kelman illuminates two ideas regarding aggressive political
behavior (war) which apply directly to this study of Lidice.
The decision of national leaders to engage in aggressive
behavior is thoughtful and deliberate.

Hitler ordered the

annihilation of Lidice in order to accomplish specific
political and strategic aims: He provided retributive
satisfaction for the German nation and made a strong display
to the Czech resistance of the consequences of rebellion.

Herbert C. Kelman, "Social-Psychological Approaches to
the Study of International Relations: Definition of Scope,"
from International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis
H. Kelman, ed., (New York: Holt Rinehart, and Winston,
1965), p. 6.
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The people involved in carrying-out the act were, according
to Kelman, exhibiting behavior that enhances social
conformity.
Like Kelman, Irving Janis discusses the conformist
dimension of human behavior in his 1982 work entitled
Groupthink.

While Janis ' s primary intention is to display

the means by which "groupthink" can lead to misguided policy
decisions, his definition of a psychological phenomenon can
shed light on the manner in which a society might arrive at
mass, concerted conclusions regarding permission and
acceptable behavior.
As defined by Janis, "groupthink" is, "an easy way to
refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they
are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the
members' striving for unanimity override their motivation to
realistically appraise alternative courses of action.
This definition can be altered somewhat and applied to
larger society in general.

Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological studies of
Policy Decisions and Fiascoes 2nd edition, (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1982).
Ibid, p. 9.
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Any successful society depends on some amount of
uniformity and cohesion for survival.

As such, they may

strive to construct a "unanimity" of values that regulate
behavior.

A society that searches for this unanimity within

the stressful context of war might collectively be extremely
receptive and positively responsive to the suggestions and
directives of their leadership.

Americans witnessed this

phenomenon during the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

Although

there had been a very significant protest against initiating
an armed conflict with Iraq, once American forces had been
committed to combat, Americans, both supporters and
opponents of the war, responded positively to the language
of the leadership who demanded that Americans "support the
troops." German civilians and soldiers living in the context
of a war in which Germany faced the threat of a powerful
coalition of enemies undoubtedly formed a societal "ingroup" and as such were susceptible to a larger form of
society-wide "groupthink" as the language of their
leadership developed and affected their behavioral values.
These analyses of the drive toward conformity in human
society suggest an independent coalition-building tendency
in human nature.

Examined more closely with the help of the
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more specific psychoanalytical theories outlined in Chapter
2, this phenomenon of social conformity reflects the
society-wide manifestation of the shame/aggression cycle
described by Lewis, Retzinger, and Scheff.

Both Kelman and

Janis relate unified social behavior to a perceived threat.
As shown in Chapter II, a threat to an individual arouses
emotions that indicate shame which, if unacknowledged, can
lead to aggressive behavior--revenge.

Keeping this

psychological cycle in mind, aggressive social conformity in
the face of a larger threat (from another nation, for
example) that is channeled into violent behavior (war)
represents a society-wide shame/aggression cycle.
This theory of unified social aggression, on the
surface, implies that permission for aggressive behavior is
not necessary for individuals to participate in or condone
such acts.

For this to hold true, theorists and historians

must present a convincing body of evidence which clearly
displays a trend of society-wide psychopathology that comes
and goes with threats to that nation.

As mentioned in

Chapter II, and again in the quote from Kelman above, the

See Bok.
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nature of social behavior and international relations is far
too complex an issue to be satisfactorily explained by a
singular theory.

As stated in Chapter 1, this work is an

effort to discover permission for pathological social
behavior.

As the internal aspects of international conflict

and social behavior are nearly infinitely complex, the
search for a singular type of permission will encounter the
same problems as other monocausal analyses.

This study,

then, must expand and detail the idea of permission to
present an adequate approach to social pathology.
One aspect of social behavioral analyses alluded to
above that must be taken into consideration is that of
context.

Harold Lasswell outlines the contextual issues of

international relations in his essay, "The Climate of
International Action."

Lasswell's general intent is an

analysis of the affectiveness of contextual "climate" as
indicated by the "mood" of a society.

By climate, Lasswell

refers to "the degree of intensity, or stress toward action
and...the value orientation of the [social majority] .

By

this, Lasswell constructs an idea of climate which includes

Harold Lasswell, "The Climate of International Action," from
Kelman, p. 341.
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all factors acting upon the general population (ie., the
economy, international situation, leadership) and the
subsequent "mood"^^^, or qualities of social values generated
among society as a result of these factors.
Having defined his terms, Lasswell continues to develop
a theory of collective social moods, the intensity of which
is directly reflective of the "crisis level
within a given society.

experienced

This collective mood is evidenced

by society-wide impulses that affect and are affected by
individual moods.

Regarding individual and collective

behavior, Lasswell writes:
...collective as well as individual moods are
important components of the international
political process. Every initiative to act
has some impact... upon the flow of mood; it
is at the phase of mood formation that
conflicting, facilitating, and nonrelevant
initiatives are consolidated and focused
toward narrower objectives. . . .

For Lasswell, the terms "climate" and "mood" are nearly synonymo
"We equate the notion of climate in international affairs with the
conception of mood, recognizing that mood can be distinguished by
degrees of intensity and by general value orientation.", ibid. [My
italics]
Ibid, p. 344.
Ibid, p. 349.
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Lasswell describes the collective mood as the point
where "all tributary initiatives and messages meet and fuse
in a dominant channel leading toward activities that conform
to or modify the previous requirements and policy.

The

importance of mood as defined and directed by the contextual
climate within which a society operates is key to
understanding international behavior.
The difficult task, according to Lasswell, is
identifying the "value orientation" of a society's mood.
For political analysis to be truly effective, theories must
provide some measure by which international behavior can be
identified and predicted.

For Lasswell, the language and

rhetoric of national leaders provides the window through
which analysts can determine the value orientation of a
society.

Hitler's speech before the Reichstag^^^ therefore

not only displays Hitler's individual intentions regarding
Central Europe, it also reflects the general value
orientation of German society.

Ibid, p. 352.
Ibid, pp. 342-343.
See chapter IV.
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Quite similar to Lasswell's discussion, Daniel Katz
continues the analysis of collective values and moods in
social behavior in his essay, "Nationalism and Strategies of
International Conflict Resolution.

Katz maintains that

by studying the nature of individuals analysts can draw
conclusions regarding the behavior of society in general.
As his study focuses on contemporary issues, Katz points to
the nature of modern nation states and the ideology of
nationalism as the psychological cement that transfers
individual "moods" to collective moods, and vice versa.
Katz identifies four main forces which contribute to
the arousal of nationalism.

The first force is found in

emotional and behavioral conditioning to national symbols.
Flags, pledges of loyalty, national anthems and slogans are
all emotionally-charged images that affect the behavior of
individuals.^®"

Katz maintains that this conditioning

See also Dean Pruitt's essay, "Definition of the
Situation as a Determinant of International Action," cited
in Kelman, p. 391. Like Katz, Pruitt traces the behavior of
the modern state to the behavior of individual citizens.
Daniel Katz, "Nationalism and Strategies of International
Conflict Resolution," cited in Kelman, pp. 358-360.
Ibid, p. 365.
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affects behavior due to the "perceived unanimity of others
following a supposed patriotic course of action.
Compliance with national behavioral norms occurs largely due
to conditioning that begins at an early age.
The formation of a "self concept as inclusive of
national identity is the second force of aroused
nationalism.

According to Katz, the identity of "self"

includes a unique self as well as a self who is part of a
larger national conglomeration.^®^

As individuals, we all

have a perception of ourselves that distinguishes us from
all others; as Americans, we also have a sense of self as a
part of a larger collective, national identity.

Individuals

among all the modern nation states have the same dualistic
identity which, as detailed by Katz above, serves to
transfer individual emotions and behavior to national
behavior.
The third force which Katz identifies is the idea that
each individual has an instrumental role to play in
maintaining the national structure and traditions of their

Ibid.
Ibid, p. 366.
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society.

This idea is based on the assumption that

individuals hold close ties to their way of life and the
structural integrity of the nation, and thus participate in
the pursuit of collective progress.

Inverting this idea,

it becomes clear (as most of the theorists cited in this
work have proposed) that threats to the integrity of the
nation will elicit emotional responses among the members of
that society.

These individual emotions, according to Katz,

will eventually transfer to collective national behavior.
Fourth among the forces that affect the arousal of
nationalism are compensatory feelings, or the projection of
self-image upon others based on individual attempts to solve
personal conflicts and insecurities.^®^

This force is

instrumental in establishing ties between individual and
national behavior.

When the international climate within

which the national mood affects an emotional response among
individuals, the source and nature of the response are
unilaterally experienced by all members of that society.
use the example of the Germans and Lidice, the emotional

Ibid, pp. 367-369.
Ibid, pp. 367-369.

To
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reaction to Heydrich's assassination was experienced by all
members of German society exposed to the event through
either media reports or more direct contact.

While the

degree or intensity of these emotions invariably differed
among individuals, there still existed, according to Katz's
theory, a transference of emotion and desires among
individuals in German society (both the Nazi elite and the
general population) that eventually manifested itself in
political action, a part of which was the destruction of
Lidice.
The messages of the above-mentioned theorists, while
each contains some unique characteristics, are all also
remarkably similar.

All maintain some measure of connection

between individual emotions and national behavior.

These

theorists all claim that analysis of individual emotions can
project the quality of social moods and intentions and
further enable prediction of national behavior.

Differences

arise among the theories concerning the precise relationship
between the general population and the elite regarding the
role of each in affecting collective social values.

Whether

this connection is a result of, or reflected in the language
of the elite is, ultimately unimportant.

The major
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contribution of these theories to this work are the emphasis
that each theorist places on the strong role that emotions
and feelings play in the nature of national behavior.

Summary: "Conscious" and "Unconscious" Permission
Examining the psychological theories outlined above
encourages a further theoretical analysis of the issues
surrounding the phenomenon of revenge and permission.

As

stated Chapter 1, the primary goal of this work is to
illuminate the manner in which social values are articulated
and manifested in societies, and the manners in which they
provide adequate permission for otherwise normal individuals
to engage in pathological behavior.

Looking at the nature

of certain psychological theories one can discern several
different ideas regarding individual and social emotions,
values, and conduct.
The theories of totalitarianism focus on the ability of
an individual leader to dictate and manipulate national
values and behavior of others.

This social control is the

product of total devotion or compliance on the part of the
general population.

To reinforce Arendt's theory, this

loyalty must be complete in order for the totalitarian to
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maintain control.

Hitler acquired and maintained this total

devotion through censorship and propaganda.

By controlling

the perceptions of German society. Hitler was able to
control social behavior arising from a collective
consciousness among the Germans.

Through his language,

Hitler controlled the perceptions and emotions of the German
population.

Applied to Lidice, Hitler articulated

conscious, direct permission both for German soldiers to
participate in the destruction of the town and for the
German people to approve of the act, thus enabling
collective pathological behavior among nonpathological
individuals.
This idea of "conscious" permission is a key factor in
understanding the behavior of the Germans regarding Lidice,
but it provides far too limited a view to apply analysis to
nontotalitarian social organizations.

While analysis of

Hitler's language is useful in examining the extent to which
Nazi values permeated German society, it discounts entirely
the role of independent individual emotions and values in
the formation of national attitudes.

In examining more

general works of behavioral political theory, it becomes
clear that individual emotions contribute to a collective
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will (mood) manifested in national behavior (policy).

The

key to understanding this national behavior with regard to
permission is the affective connection between individual
emotions and national policy.

A people united by a common

ideology (nationalism) are conditioned to have similar
emotional reactions to national images and traditions.^®®
When international events affect these national images, the
emotional reactions of members of that nation are common in
quality if not intensity.

It is from this common,

collective emotional reaction that the idea of unconscious
permission emerges.

In the case of the Germans and Lidice,

the assassination of Heydrich represented a distinct threat
to a dominant image of the Nazi state.

On an individual

level, Germans felt threatened by some degree of alienation.
As detailed in Chapter II, this alienation represents the
initial emotion in the shame/aggression cycle developed by
Lewis, Retzinger, and Scheff.

Each German, to some degree

of intensity, experienced the cycle of shame, the most
common psychological outcome of which is aggressive behavior
manifested in the search for a remedy to shameful emotions

See Katz above.
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through revenge.

This shared emotional process provides

"unconscious" permission--the second necessary aspect of
permission for pathological behavior.
The tragedy of revenge during wartime is a problem
which can be understood, in part, through an examination of
emotions and feelings.

Should policy makers adopt a more

sensitive approach to the problems of emotions and revenge
in war, their efforts to contain the potential for revenge
would entail restricting the issuance of "conscious"
permission for such acts.

These efforts of decision makers

regarding prevention of wartime revenge can, regardless of
precautions mandated by policy, be easily compromised by
military leaders, whose charges hold the will and the means
by which wartime revenge is ultimately carried-out.

This

study attempts not only to illuminate the need for more
sensitivity regarding feelings and emotions in international
policy decisions, but also the need for a more enlightened
approach to military leadership in this new era of
international peacekeeping.
Hitler, on December 22, 1941, proclaimed himself
supreme commander of the German military.

By doing so, he

projected his values onto the ranks of the German armed
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forces.

While German soldiers certainly did not adopt

Hitler's values and opinions wholesale, there can be no
doubt that Hitler's rhetoric, taken in the context of
partisan armed conflct (a conflict atmosphere made even more
bitter by Heydrich's assassination) enabled those soldiers
to be more receptive to the more pathological attitudes of
their Commander-in-Chief.

John Keegan discusses the way in

which Hitler established and utilized his "Theatre of
Leadership."^"

In the following analysis of Hitler's

command style, Keegan describes the means by which Hitler's
emotional and evocative language affected the behavior of
German soldiers--especially those soldiers of the junior
ranks, who would have to make the individual ethical
decision to carry-out the orders of their superiors.
Shameless though Hitler's manipulation
of the heroic value system was, its
effectiveness was borne out by results.
The German army of 1945, unlike that of
1918, fought unquestioningly to the end.
...the run of the mill officers and
common soldiers gave him their total
loyalty and surrendered at the last only
when ordered to do so.
John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Penguin
Books, 1987), p. 304.
Ibid, p. 307.
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Just as Hitler used his rhetoric to affect the climate
of German politics, he similarly infused his values among
the ranks of the German military.

The relationship between

the attitudes of military leaders and the behavior of their
troops is a very sophisticated matter, and one which is not
likely to be conclusively detailed through any amount of
psychological and political theory.

Themeans by which

leaders direct the behavior of their forces consists of,
among other factors, an intangible quality that defies
concise definition, yet it can never be denied that such a
quality exists.

From antiquity to the present, theorists

have wrestled with this fundamental issue of the
relationship between leaders and their soldiers: How do
commanders come to effectively control of their soldiers?
Clausewitz described this relationship as the "military
virtue of an army."^®®
This is distinguished from mere bravery,
and still more from enthusiasm for the
business of war. The first is certainly
a necessary constituent part of it, but
in the same way as bravery, which is a
natural gift in some men, may arise in a
Carl von Clausewitz, On War Anatol Rapoport, ed. ,
York: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 254.

(New

146

soldier as a part of an Army from habit
and custom, so with him it must also
have a different direction.... It must
lose that impulse to unbridled activity
and exercise of force which is its
characteristic in the individual
[bravery and enthusiasm], and submit
itself to demands of a higher kind, to
obedience, order, rule, and method.
Enthusiasm for the profession gives life
and greater fire to the military virtue
of an army, but does not necessarily
constitute a part of it.^®®
The military virtue of an army thus describes a departure
from personal heroics by individual soldiers, to a
collective behavior, based on "habit and custom," that is
shaped and utilized by commanders--"obediance, order, rule,
and method."

Anyone who has observed the military closely

can appreciate this "invisible hand" of leadership produced
by the relationship between a group of soldiers
(specifically their collective behavior) and their leaders.
Soldiers follow orders for many reasons.

Military

indoctrination impresses upon soldiers the importance of
following orders, for if a soldier fails to follow orders,
the consequences could bring personal (and, in theory,
political) devastation.

Ibid.

Noncompliance in an individual
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soldier could lead to his own death as well as that of other
soldiers, thus putting the outcome of the mission, the
battle, and perhaps even the war in doubt.

Furthermore, the

fear of punishment can coerce soldiers to act.

Aside from

indoctrination and fear, there is another aspect of the
relationship between leaders and subordinates.

Soldiers can

mold their behavior to reflect and react to the intentions
of their leaders in a response to a belief (or at least a
sincere hope) that their leader truly makes decisions,
especially in combat, that will provide for the good of the
unit and realize the best potential for keeping the soldiers
alive.

As much as this belief is a powerful motivating

force within military organizations, so can it provide
motivation in a larger social scale in wartime.
As these motivating forces of leadership applied to the
behavior of nations during World War II, every person in
continental Europe, whether they were an actual combatant or
not, could at least remain somewhat unsurprised should they
be directly affected by the fighting.

The Germans, due to

the geographic centrality of their position were especially
sensitive to the notions of total war and "a nation in
arms."

The effectiveness of Hitler's rhetoric in
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influencing, directly and indirectly the behavioral values
of the German people is evident in the context of the war
and upon reflection on the theories outlined above.

While

Hitler's language was not the single force driving German
values and behavior, German society was nonetheless heavily
influenced by the words of a charismatic and trusted leader.
Applied to the role of today's military forces in
international peacekeeping operations, the need to contain
the potential for pathological behavior is paramount.

The

conduct of soldiers, like any other human beings, is
affected by the language of their superiors.

Through

language, leaders can elicit emotional responses among their
soldiers that will provide collective "unconscious"
permission for pathological behavior via the emotional cycle
connected with shame.

Leaders, by virtue of their

authoritative position, can further issue orders that
provide soldiers with the "conscious" permission necessary
for pathological retribution.

Efforts must be taken at all

stages of the implementation of international peacekeeping
policy--from the formation of policy in negotiations to the
execution of policy at the hands of military organizations-to contain the dissemination of permissive values that
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increase the potential for pathological behavior and the
tragedies arising from such behavior.

chapter VI
Revenge now and in the Future

In February, 1991, the 1st Marine Division spearheaded
the offensive to liberate Kuwait City from occupying Iraqi
forces during the ground phase of the Persian Gulf War.
Once the city had been secured by forces of the Allied
Coalition, units of the 1st Marine Division were ordered to
withdraw to the rear, charged with war crimes.

It was

alleged that the Marines had shot surrendering Iraqis
(rather than take them prisoner) and desecrated the bodies
of the dead.

An interview with a former Marine who

participated in the offensive (and who requested anonymity)
revealed that he and his comrades had "killed every Iraqi
[they] saw."

He said that it did not matter whether the

Iraqi soldiers were fighting or fleeing, the Marines engaged
all with equally deadly force.

When asked why they had done

this, the Marine responded that they had been told stories
detailing the gruesome brutality of the Iraqis in Kuwait
just prior to the onset of the ground war.

In addition, the

operations order given to these Marines included the

1 Rn
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directive to "sweep and clear with extreme prejudice.
It is clear that, at some level, the leadership of the
1st Marine Division provided the Marines in their command
with both unconscious and conscious permission to engage in
pathological behavior.

By telling, or at least encouraging

stories describing the brutality of the Iraqis in their
treatment of the Kuwaitis, the Marine leaders potentially
initiated psychological shame/rage cycles that provided the
Marines with the unconscious permission for pathological
behavior.

Further, by using the language, "sweep and clear

with extreme prejudice," the leaders provided the Marines
with conscious permission to engage and kill the Iraqis
without set limits of engagement.

Without meaning to have

done so, the Officers of the 1st Marine Division set the
stage within which pathological behavior potentially
overrode restraint and led to an avoidable tragedy.
While the intent of the Marine Officers during the

Anonymous, interviewed by author, transcript, Missoula,
Montana, 5 December 1995.
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Persian Gulf War was undoubtedly not sinister, other,
deliberate acts of revenge continue to hamper global
peacekeeping efforts today.

Recently, at the trial of

accused Serbian war criminal, Dusan Tradic, testimony of
residents of the Bosnian town of Brcko accompanied amateur
video footage of the 1992 "cleansing" of that town.

The

video records images of a small child hanging from the
minaret of a mosque.

Another scene shows refrigerated

trucks full of bodies pull up to a meat rendering plant and
unload the corpses into large vats.

Throughout the tape are

panoramic shots of the village with bodies lining the
roads.
The Dayton Peace Accord, seen initially as a diplomatic
triumph in the efforts to restore peace in BosniaHerzegovina, is in jeopardy due to the experiences such as
the massacre at Brcko.

The peace accord calls for the

reintegration of the different ethnic populations of the
region.

The vengeful backlash from the experience of the

war is evident today.

Across Bosnia, the ethnic populations

still enforce segregation with threats of violence.

Efforts

Scott Peterson, "Justice for Bosnia May Rest on Mixed
Memories," The Christian Science Monitor 10 May 1996, p. 1.
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by UN peacekeepers to actively reintegrate Bosnia are met
with equally active resistance.

Recently, a Muslim

addressing a crowd intent on stopping Serbs from returning
to their neighborhoods said, "I'm from a village where [the
Serbs] destroyed everything, where they killed many
civilians.

The people who did the crimes left, and now they

want to come back.

It is not allowed.""^

Clearly, the Serbs wanting to return to their
neighborhoods are not necessarily guilty of war crimes; they
are, however guilty by ethnic association in the eyes of the
Muslims.

The experience of four years of bitter warfare and

partisanship has given all the ethnic groups of Bosnia
unconscious permission to enact revenge against their former
enemies.

As leaders such as Serbs Radovan Karadzic and

military chief Ratko Mladic continue to use vindictive
rhetoric, they supply their followers with unconscious
permission for pathological behavior.

At the present, the

peace in Bosnia is maintained through the threat of military
force only.

If the statesmen of the region continue to

aggravate the tension between the ethnic groups in Bosnia,

Scott Peterson, "Dreams of a Unified Bosnia Fade as
Ethnic Lines Harden," The Christian Science Monitor 2 0 May
1996, p. 14.
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the peaceful unification of Bosnia will become increasingly
less probable.
In another region wracked by conflict between ethnic
groups, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has recently
been threatened by Israel's offensive military operations
directed against Hizbulla guerrillas in Lebanon.

Acting in

revenge for increased terrorism on the part of Islamic
extremists, Israel's military campaign has claimed the lives
of many civilians, to include an air attack on a UN
installation on 18 April, 1996 which killed seventy
refugees.
In Kuwait, Bosnia, and Israel, atrocities and continued
tension have resulted from permission granted by leaders for
people to engage in pathological acts of revenge.

Whether

this permission was granted intentionally or by accident,
the results were, in psychological and sociological terms,
nearly identical.

There is little that leaders can do to

contain or combat unconscious permission, as that type
legitimation is a personal and social reaction to certain
events and contextual stimuli.

Efforts can be made,

John Battersby, "Israelis See One Side of War," The
Christian Science Monitor 19 April 1996, p. 1.
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however, to limit the potential for war atrocities through
eliminating and countering conscious permission through
rhetoric and direct orders.

These efforts place new burdens

on statesmen, military leaders, and individual soldiers.
While these new challenges to peacekeeping are
unprecedented, they have in recent years been met
successfully.

In the Fall of 1994, elements of the U.S.

Army's 82nd Airborne division took-off in C-141 aircraft
bound for Haiti.

Their mission was to secure the city of

Port-au-Prince and use force to ensure that the country's
military regime stepped down and allowed popularly-elected
president Jean Bertuand Aristide to take office.

While the

forces were en route, a diplomatic delegation led by former
President Carter succeeded in negotiating a peaceful
transfer of power.

The soldiers of the 82nd Airborne had to

quickly reorient their mission posture from direct combat to
peacekeeping.

This "mid-stream diaper change" presented a

number of problems and demanded a high level of maturity
from individual soldiers, some not much older than 18 years,
and their entire chain-of-command.

In the end, the 82nd

Airborne's mission was a success and the U.S. forces were
able to occupy Haiti without major incident.
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While the success of the 82nd Airborne represents a
triumph on the part of military leaders and soldiers in
limiting the potential for pathological behavior and
tragedy, recent efforts by the leadership of the Palestinian
Liberation Organization in Israel are aimed at limiting the
dissemination of conscious permission through rhetoric.

On

24 April, 1995, the Palestinian National Council voted 50454 to remove language from the charter of the P.L.O.
demanding the destruction of Israel."^

Such a move clearly

represents an effort to stop rhetoric that conveys
permission for normal people to engage in pathological acts
aimed at destroying the state of Israel.

While the P.L.O.

leadership can do little to control vindictive emotions
among Palestinians arising from long years of conflict with
Israel, they are attempting to lesson the potential for
(

tragedy by ending official sanctioning of violence directed
against Israelis.
While this work is primarily intended as an analysis of
behavior in wartime, it is difficult to undertake such a
work without addressing potential solutions to the problems.

John Battersby, "Palestinians Boost Mideast Peace, End
Call for Destruction of Israel," The Christian Science
Monitor 26 April 1996, p. 6.
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Any effort to outline solutions to complex and troubling
political problems such as revenge is bound to be incomplete
due to the seemingly endless varieties of challenges posed
in the international arena.

If, as Quincy Wright posited,

the study of international relations is an attempt to
analyze the summation of all knowledge,^''" then the chances
of developing a comprehensive solution are slim indeed.

But

the problem of revenge and permission in warfare needs to be
addressed if contemporary peacemakers and peacekeepers are
to hope for success in their endeavors.
Chapter V presented a bifocal approach to the
phenomenon of permission and pathology.

Any potential

solution to the problem of revenge must address either
conscious or unconscious permission, or both.

Since

unconscious permission is a product of an individual's
reaction to contemporary events, little can be done to
prevent its effects beyond acknowledging its presence and
potential.

If, however, national decision makers, military

leaders, and soldiers are aware of the potential for
disaster raised by their emotional reactions to certain

Quincy Wright, The Study of International Relations New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955.
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events, perhaps they can take steps to avoid giving
themselves over to a shame/rage cycle that produces
unconscious permission.
Conscious permission is a much easier issue to address.
Leaders must be aware of the affectiveness of their
language.

If a leader can understand the manner in which

the use of certain inflammatory language increases the
likelihood for pathological behavior among subordinates,
then that leader can strive to avoid such language, as in
the case of the recent efforts of the P.L.O.
The problem with this attempt at a solution is that
many leaders are aware of the affectiveness of their
rhetoric and welcome the potential for violence among their
followers.

Hitler certainly intended to grant what this

study calls conscious permission to the German nation
through his rhetoric.

Leaders like Adolf Hitler, Radovan

Karadzic, and any others who use language to "vow revenge"
understand completely the manner in which their rhetoric
influences the behavior of their followers.

The destruction

of Lidice in 1942 and the willingness with which his
soldiers participated in the massacre could not have been
much of a surprise to Hitler.

He had been hard at work
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since the 1920's to ensure that his followers would be able
to engage in such pathological behavior when he ordered them
to do so.

No amount of enlightenment or attention to

emotions can stop leaders such as this from granting
conscious permission for revenge to their subjects.
In conclusion, then, this study aims to illuminate the
problem of revenge, language, and social pathology in an
attempt to limit the probability of still further, but
avoidable wartime tragedies.

The ever-increasing reliance

of peacemakers on military organizations to enforce their
arrangements demands a heightened awareness among military
leaders of the manner in which emotions and language can
affect their own behavior, as well as that of their
soldiers.

The U.S. military can no longer afford to ignore

the importance of individual and collective emotions.
Leadership courses and manuals must be updated for leaders
from the infantry rifle team leader all the way up to the
Natioal War Colleges to include an examination of the
important role that emotions play in affecting behavior
among individual soldiers.

Those leaders who continue to

deliberately use language to grant permission for
pathological behavior will always pose a threat to

160

international security.

Perhaps, however, by identifying

the potential that these leaders generate for tragedy, other
national leaders and peacemakers might be able to anticipate
trouble and thus move to block any further spread of
hostilities that could result from such sinister
manipulations of emotions.
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